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INTRODUCTION 
One of the fundamental questions that philosophies of 
Aesthetics have attempted to resolve is whether a concept or objective 
beauty can be validated or justified. There have been aestheticians 
who have asserted that not only is such a concept valid but the 
subjective elements in the aesthetic experience only serve to hide 
the actual beauty. 1 On the other hand others have maintained that 
the experience of beauty is fundamentally subjective. For example, 
an essential feature of the philosophy of the Romantic movement was 
that beauty is "the expression of life and personality in the objects 
of art and nature. 112 
The concept of empathy, originally ""EintUb.lung arose in 
attempting to clarify the subjective nature of the aesthetic 
experience. The term Einf'Uhlung however has been used with rather 
different connotations by different aestheticians. As a result the 
term does little more to pinpoint a particular aesthetic theory than 
to indicate the subjective emphasis of the theory. 'EintUhlung 
1 
"We must disentangle the pattern of perceptions which the 
work of art has interwoven. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
the subjective stimulants of sympathy be outside the realm of 
objective beauty which is valid for all men at all times." (Johann 
Freidrich Herbart, "Practical Philosopby" in Philosophies of Beauty 
by Carritt [New York:a Oxford University Press, 1931], p. 151.) 
~rl of Listowel, Critical History of Modern Aesthetics 
(London: George Allen and Unwen Ltd., 1933 , P• 51. 
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literally means "feeling into" an object and although at times with 
Lipps it seems to mean "feeling in" an object, be does share the 
"feeling into 11 notion that is COliiilon to the other two theories that 
shall be discussed. The three writers with which we shall be 
concerned, Theodor Lipps, 1 Vernon Lee (pseudonym for Violet Paget)2 
and Hugo Munsterberg,~ can be classed together then, because of 
their notion that a person attributes to an aesthetic object 
qualities whose "ultimate" source is in the person himself. These 
three have developed the notion most elaborately. Before dealing 
with them separately, and in detail, it will be well to indicate 
some of the considerations that lead to a theory of aesthetic 
empathy, those problems in the aesthetic experience for which 
empathy comes to give a certain type of answer. 
The visual aesthetic experience with which the empathy 
theories discussed here are mostly concerned can be studied within 
two frameworks. These frameworks are not absolute categories but 
directions through which the aesthetic expe.rience as discussed by 
the empathists could be analyzed. On the one han<'~. the aesthetic 
1903). 
],1sthetik, Vols. I, II (Hamburg: VerJ.a,g Von Leopold Voss, 
2 The Beautiful (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1913); and in collaboration with c. Ansrutier-Thomson, Beauty and 
U lineae and Other Studies in Ps holo cal Aesthetics (Londona 
John Lane Co., 1912 • 
~e Principles of Art Education (New York: Prang Educational 
Co., 1905h and "The Problem of Beauty, ii Philosophical Review, XVIII 
(1909), PP• 121-146. 
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experience can be assumed 11:) involve perceptive end cognitive processes 
in which the observer gains intonation about 1he aest~tic object. 
As such the aesthetic eJq?e rience can be com:J;ared with simple cognitive 
processes inwlved in perceiving~ say, that an object is red, or blue, 
square, or rectangular. Secondly, let us assume the aesthetic 
experience is one that 'Ms a certain pleasure content. The observer, 
if' he is not indifferent to 'the aestretic experience, will be affected 
either positively or mgatively and he will e~erience either satis-
faction or dissatisfaction. (Satisfaction can be interpreted quite 
broadly and each of the empathy theories to be discussed explain it 
differently.) In the cognitive processes,in genera~ it seems that 
although the observer plays a major role, this role is usually unim-
portant an:l perhaps irrelevant to him. He may know that he is involved 
but ha does not actually feel himself involved. On the other hand when 
dealing with experiemes that contain a dimension of pleasure~ the 
observer genere.lly feels himself cent;ral in the e:x:perienoe and the 
object which is the soUl"ce of pleasure or displeasure is given a 
secondary role. Now tle aesthetic experience does not function either 
as a pleasure experience or as a cognitive experience. It stands in 
a unique relationship to the pleasure experience and the cognitive 
experience and requires special treatment when considered functioning 
within either of these frameworks. 
First let us consider the aesthetic e:x;perience in terms of 
the pleasure dimension. 
In b aesthetic case (and we are directing ourselves 
particularly U, the visual aesthetic case) the aesthetic object 
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maintains a central role. It a per son is stung by a bee or it he 
smells the odor ot a skunk he is concerned mainly with his sensations 
and not with its source. One might even consider whether 'l:he sting 
or the odor produced artificially would change the essential content 
ot the experience. But central to the development ot the empathy 
theories that shall be discussed later is the view that in the case 
ot the aesthetic experience the content ot the experience fbr the 
observer cannot be separated from its source, the aesthetic object. 
As we shall see the observer does not dwell on the sensations or 
feelings as his body or person experiences them, but constantly relates 
them to their cause in the aesthetic object. One ot -tne observations 
that might have brought the empathists to this view is that the 
observer usually expresses the extent of his pleasure as a jud~ent 
ot beauty regarding the aesthetic object. The person stung by the 
bee or smelling the foul odor ot the skunk reacts by saying "it hurts" 
or "it smells" in reference to himself. The reaction to a positive 
or negative aesthetic experience, however, is in the form "the painting 
is beautiful 11 or 11that man is ugly. " 
Central to the theories ot aesthetic empathy are explanations 
as to how the pleasure in the observer is related to the object. But 
even among 'the empathists there are variations as to exactly what is 
involved in relating these sensations or feelings of pleasure to the 
object. There are those like Munsterberg and Lipps who feel that 
empathy (i.e. attribution of feelings) is a prerequisite of aesthetic 
pleasure, the aesthetic experience cannot be consummated wi1:bout the 
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abstraction of feelings from the observer and their projection onto 
the aesthetic object. Vernon Lee is one empathist who does not seem 
to agree that attribution is the basio condition for pleasure but 
nevertheless needs attribution for other reasons. For Vernon Lee the 
observer feels (or does not feel) pleasure in reacting to the aesthetic 
object as he would feel in a simpler way in reacting to any sensation~ 
except that in tm aesthetic situation the pleasure is not localizable 
in 'the body of the observer. The ordinary pleasure feeling may be 
located in a certain part of our body~ whereas the aesthetic feelings 
are diffuse in relation to our body. So there results a tendency to 
locate the feelings in the external object which brougpt about the 
feelings. 1 This means of course that the object then seems to express 
these feelings. 
Whenever during the contemplation of an object our 
bodily feelings and moods corresponding with the 
expressive forms of the object happen not to be per-
ceptibly locali.zed in our own body~ then they will 
simply till the object • • • then there arises that 
condition which subsequent reflection makes us designate 
as projection ot ourselves into the object. 2 
Lee then does have a theory of attribution so that the object 
remains involved in the aesthetic experience but it is a much weaker 
involvement than Lipps' and :Munsterberg's involvement. 
For Munsterberg the value of the aesthetic experience lies 
in experiencing the object as it is in itselt~ isolated from all 
1Lee~ Beauty and Ugliness, PP• 30~ 53. 
~arl Groos, ~~ Aesthetische Miterleben," Zeitschritt fur 
Aeathetik~ IV Band, Hett 2, p. 181. as quoted by Lee, Beaut( and 
Ugiiness, P• 87. 
i:x: 
other objects and tbB observer can experience pleasure insofar as 
it is the object alone which absorbs him. 
In Lipps, aesthetic involvement with the object is stronger 
than it is for either Munsterberg or Lee. For Lipps the aesthetic 
pleasure consists of participating in activity which takes place in 
the aesthetic objeot. (How the observer is able to do this and haw 
the observer is in a sense the ultimate source of the aoti vi ty going 
on in the object will be dealt with in the chapter on Lipps.) 
Suffice it to say now that tht a phenomenon of participation which 
is referred to by Lipps as ~ini'Uhlung or empathy, is a prerequisite 
for aesthetic pleasure and for Lipps as well as Munsterberg the 
object maintains a central position in the aesthetic experience 
because the aesthetic pleasure is, in a certain sense, attached 
to the object. 
We see that considerations concerning the relationship 
between the experience of pleasure and the aesthetic object are 
involved in the development of a concept of empathy. 1 In addition, 
1 Consideration of this problem is also central to the aesthetic 
of George Santayana {excerpts fran "sense of Beauty" in Modern Book ot 
Aesthetics, ed. Melvin Rader (New Yorkt Henry Holt and Co., 1935], 
PP• 1:36-145.) He has developed a theory :ahich has great similarity to 
the emphathists. According to his view beauty can be seen as a quality 
of an object as color, proportion or size. This comes about by refer-
ring the pleasure of the sensations from an object back to the object 
that caused the sensations. Santayana's "objectification of' pleasure" 
(ibid., p. 142) is basically the attribution of' what he believes to be 
tiie"'&'esthetic quality, i.e. pleasure~ to the object. Through this 
attribution pleasure is transformed to Beauty. The empathists also 
believed that more is attributed to the object than the sensations ot 
color, shape, etc., but the,y did not discuss this ~re", the aesthetic 
quality, in ter.ms of the quality of pleasure. Rather the aesthetic 
X 
there are certain problems concerning cognitive .functioning in the 
aesthetic experience which the empathy theories come to answer and 
which seem to have played an important role in the development of 
the systems of empathy. 
Just as when we say "it is a beautif'ul vase" we are telling 
some-thing o.f our pleasure reaction so, at the same time are we 
involved in taking cognizance of certain shapes and colors. And 
not only o.f shapes and colors but in the aesthetic experience we 
take cognizance of qualities going beyond mere shapes and colors 
and attribute words like "dynamic, 11 "moving," "gay," "quiet." But 
let us start from the beginning and see what cognition of shapes 
and colors is, and hew cognition of other qualities relate to them. 
Implied in the views of the empathists is tilt .following view 
of cognition. In the elementary cognitive processes there is a well-
defined correspondence between the qualities attributed to an object 
and the visual sensations "transmitted" by the object. There is in 
us a sensation of red upon focusing on an object and we see the 
object as red. The epistemological problem of how we know that 
redness is an "objective" quality is not important here. The point 
is that there is a psychological phenomenon by which a sensation in 
us causes us to draw a conclusion about an object focused upon. In 
the aesthetic experience, however, there no longer seems to be a 
correspondence between visual sensations and attributions. The 
qualities attributed to the object were basically those of activit,y 
and movement.ibjee had pleasure-dimensions but were of a more 
defined character, than the general quality of pleasure in Santayana's 
aesthetic. 
::x:i 
qualities attributed to the aesthetic object go beyond the visual 
sensations transmitted by the object. It is a familiar phenomenon 
that we ascribe d;ynamio am even human, life qualities to inanimate 
aesthetic objects. This seems in !'act to be a perfectly natural 
way f'or conveying our impressions of' a work of' art. Apparently 
then, the observer maintains an illusion regarding the aesthetic 
objeot. 1 He sees more in the object than the object ostensibly 
has to show. If' we now ask how this takes place, tbs empathy theory 
provides a ready formula. The source of the attributes which we 
ascribe to the object that do not correspond to sensations caused 
by the object, is in ourselves. What it is that takes place in 
ourselves and whether it is really "taking place" depends on which 
theory we speak of'. In all of them there is some t;ype of' actiTity 
taking place in the observer. In each of these theories we may 
speak of' ordinary qualities and aesthetic qualities attributed to 
the object. 
Before examining this further we should point out that it 
is possible to question the validity of the phenomenon which we are 
describing. It is possible to maintain that fUndamentally the 
1w"e are referri~ to illusion in the sense that E. H. 
Gombrich discusses it. (Art and Illusion [Pantheon Books, 1960], 
Introduction, chaps. 7 and 9.) Illusion is not a figment of' one's 
imagination but the Vf!Yry way of' seeing things. Gombrich does dif't'er 
!'rom the empathists in that he extends illusion to all perception 
while the empathists imply the existence of some primary sensations. 
He !'eels tba. t one can't differentiate between primary sensations and 
illusory qualities or secondary sensations. "There is no rigid 
distinction between perception and illusion" {p. 29). 
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aesthetic experience is no more illusory than any other cognitive 
process. This position is taken, fbr example, by Rudolph Arnheim, 
a Gestalt psychologist Who negates the role of empathy in aesthetics.~ 
When we say that an illusion takes place in the perception 
of an aesthetic object, we assume that the sensations that can be 
caused by an object and that can be said to correspond to a "reality• 
in the object are necessarily of an "elementary" we--e. g. color--
and that the entire visual phenomenon must be built up from there. 
According to Arnheim this is fundamentally incorrect.2 An object 
may incorporate complex qualities which can only be conceived in 
their emirety. It is these complex qualities or patterns which 
can be considered as the aesthetic qualities of an object. (Arnheim 
feels that whenever we see an object as a unified pattern we are 
seeing it as an aesthetic object.8 ) These patterns have a real 
objective existence and meaning and do not come into being by means 
of an illusion on the part of the observer. 4 Rather the meaning of 
the expression of the object is self-evident. "Expression is an 
inherent characteristic of perceptual patterns • .s The expression in 
an object does not have to be associated with human emotions or 
1Rudolph'ArDheim, ~rt and Visual Perception (Berkeley: 
University of California Preas, 1954). 
2 Ibid., PP• 361-376. 
8 Ibid., P• 31 •• 
-
4 Ibid., P• 368. 
6~· 
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experiences. "Expression has its origin in the perceived pattern and 
in tm reaction of the brain field of vision to this pattern. "1 Arnheim 
does not believe that the pattern of an object is statio ani we impose 
upon a static situation dynamic associations. Rather he feels that an 
objeot seen as a pattern expresses movement to begin with. Tbi s per-
caption consists in the formation within ba.self' of a complex of 
sensations which in their entirety correspond exactly to the pattern. 
Thus the complex situation is the same as in any cognitive process 
in which a sensation in the observer corresponds to a qua.li ty of the 
perceived object. 
By maintaining such a view Arnheim places himself among the 
"objective" aestheticians of whom we spoke earlier. The raison d 'etre 
of' empathy is to make precise a subjective aesthetics, an aesthetics 
where the subjective elements become embodied in the object. This 
must be qualified in Lipps' case where the qualities of the object 
are expressions of a greater mode of' Being but can only be realised 
through the observer's experience. For the empathists then, it is a 
basic premise that one cannot in •reality" perceive aesthetic 
qualities in an object and these must come about by some kind of 
illusion. It is important to realize, however, that this is a premise 
and involves an interpretation of' the aesthetic experience which one 
may dispute as, for example, Arnheim does. 
Let us consider briefly the nature of' the illusion which the 
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empathists ascribe to an aesthetic experience. Here we shall have 
to treat Lipps separately from Lee and Munsterberg. For Lee and 
Munsterberg the aesthetic qualities of an object correspond to some-
thing that is '*going on" in the observer, something that is put into 
or attributed to the object. For Lipps the aesthetic qualities do 
already exist in the object in a metaphysical sense, i.e. th~ underlle 
the physical objects, but they are not obvious on the perceptive level 
except through the interpretation of the observer. So tor all prac• 
tical purposes the observer attributes illusory qualities to the 
object according to Lipps as well as Munsterberg and Lee. 
For Lee am Munsterberg what takes place on the cognitive 
side of the empathy theory in the attribution of qualities can be 
described (at least theoretically) in more or less concrete psycho-
logical terms. The aesthetic object transmits data to the observer 
which are received in the fo:rm ot what we may call primary sensations. 
These are the sensations which correspond directly to the "real 11 non-
aesthetic qualities of the objects, e.g. the redness of an object. 
These sensations arouse, as a result of associations and memories, 
that which may be referred to as secondary sensations. 1 What i8 the 
1 There is a difference between the classical definition of 
primary and secondary qualities and what has been discussed here as 
primary or secondary sensations. The empathists and particularly Lee 
and Munsterberg are not interested. in the epistemological problem ot 
the existence or qualities in an object as were Locke and Berkeley. 
The problem tor these classical philosophies was whether there are 
qualities in an object that are conceivable without reference to human 
sensations. If there are such qualities they would be referred to as 
primary qualities. Other qualities which had to be felt were referred 
XV 
nature of the secondary sensations for the empathists? For Munsterberg 
they consist of kinaesthetic muscular activities on the part of the 
observer; for Lee~ they consist of the ideas of activity as derived 
from memories of past activities. This sha.ll become clearer in our 
discussion of Lee. In either theory there are present in the observer 
complex psychological states. {In Munsterberg psychological states 
are equated with physiologioal states.) These states are interpreted 
as qualities of the object of perception and these qualities consti-
tute the aesthetic content of the object. As a result an object is 
seen as moving or dynamic. i.e. the lines and shapes seem to DJDV8 and 
stretch and bend. Since movement is associated with the animate and 
living this means that the object seems to take on life am vitality. 
Now how are tm secondary sensations attributed to the object? The. 
answer which forms a crucial part of the theory is that for the 
to as secondary qualities. Locke felt that qualities of extension, 
DJDtion. figure were primary qualities and had an existence independent 
of the observer while color and odor were secondary qualities and 
depended upon the obserVer. Berkeley felt that neither primary or 
seconda:ry sensations have an existence outside of the mind of the 
observer. 
Lee and :Munsterberg are not concerned with the problem of the 
reality of the 1qualities of an object. They take the common sense 
view that there does exist an object out there but that is aside from 
their main concern which is a psychological one. Their interest lies 
in the sensations the observer receives. the retinal image. the 
vibrations of the ear drum. They are interested in the qualities of 
8Jl object oJlly as they exist through the sensations. The secondary 
sensations are those which are mt directly attributable to the object 
{as are the primary sensations) but are a result of the primary 
sensations. 
Lee and Munsterberg are not trying to say anything about the 
outside liOrld except to describe the :f'lmctioning of man's mind in 
relation to certain objects in it. They do not make the· jump from 
discussing man's mind to positing {as Berkeley does) all there is in 
the world is man's mind. 
observer there is no essential difference between the primary and 
secondary sensations to which we referred. The mechanism by which 
primary sensations are sensed as being a reality in the object applies 
equally well to seoondary sensations. The question now arisea as to 
what conditions must be prevalent in order that there be aroused in 
the observer these secondary sensations. 
We shall see further within the system of each empathy theory 
the conditions f'or the cognition of aesthetic qualities. 
The basic questions asked by the empathists are then the 
following: What is the mechanism for the illusion that accompanies 
the perception of' the aesthetic object? Secondly. what is the basis 
f'or the pleasure and satisfaction--equivalently. the displeasure and 
dissatisfaction--that is part of' the aesthetic experienoe? 
In answering these questions we shall have to examine carefully 
the process of' perception and attribution, the distinotive qualities 
of' an aesthetic object. and the relationship between the aesthetic 
experience and other lif'e experiences. As we have indicated, though 
Lipps. Lee. and Munsterberg may all be referred to as empathists, 
they have rather different approaches in these matters. 
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CHAPTER I 
THEODOR LIPPS 
.A. Einf'llhlung and Pleasure 
Theodor Lipps is the psychologist of' art with lbom the concept 
of EinfUhlun~ is most widely associated. It is characteristic of 
Lipps' theory that the concept of' Einf'Uhlung by lbioh the aesthetic 
experience may be explained, is applicable to a much broader range 
of' phenomena. As a special application of' this concept the problems 
of' pleasure and cognition, as they have been presented in the intro-
duction as problems of the aesthetic experience, can be solved. 
EinfUhlung is for Lipps the phenomenon by which the activity 
that one sees in objects out side oneself' is felt as t~ activity of' 
one's own self. Briefly stated, this extension of' one's self' is 
possible because all objects in the world, animate or inanimate, can 
be viewed as participating in a common mode of' Being. What we have 
called illusory qualities are just the manifestation of' Being in 
objects but sinoe the observer can only realize Being in an external 
object by applying the categories of Being in his own experience, 
empathy is then also the process by which the self' is attributed to 
external activities and expressions to give them an inner dimension. 
Einf'Uhlung extends to all objects and situations and involves 
a pleasure-displeasure alternative. For Lipps the basic source of' 
pleasure is involvement in activity. More correctly, for Lipps 
1 
pleasure is meaningful only as a mode or a quality of activity. 1 To 
say that we derive pleasure from an experience is to say that we are 
"positively" (rather th&n "negatively") involved in an activity. This 
is an underlyi~ premise of Lipps ' the<r y and is i:he reason that Lipps 
explains as the basis for the pleasure in aesthetics the ability of a 
person to involve himself in activity cutside of his person. 
Lipps begins by disoussi~ 'the ordinary circumstance of a 
person doing soDBthing and the simple pleasure received from absorption 
of the sel:f' in hi. s acti "'ity. 2 In contrast with this one could go 
through activities perfunctorily with concern only for the outcome 
of the aoti vi ty and not with the pleasure of experiencing it. (This 
might be what differentiates the :{ractioal situation from the aesthetic 
one.) In any case, thls is the simplest type of activity that inter-
ests Lipps. He refines the idea of activity as he goes along. It 
comes '00 apply to some1ili:og 1ha t someone else is doing but l'il.i ch i:he 
observer experiences as if' he were doing it himself • 8 It is at this 
seoom stage of activity that we can begin to apply the term 
E~uhlung• The observer is mt overtly active but his self can 
experience the activity manifested in ather persons or objects. He 
uses the example ot the acrobat to explain this. Although the 
observer is not; himself' swingi~ and balancing, as he watohes the 
J. " Lipps, Asthetik, Vol. II, P• 3. 
2~., Vol. I, p. 97f'. 
8 !Qid., Vol. I, PP• 114, 120. 
2 
acrobats he experiences the strains and stresses inside himself that 
he would experience if he were going through the overt actions of 
the acrobat. (llhat exactly he means by experiencing the inner 
activity of the person observed will becoJOO clearer as we proceed.) 
In particular, it does not mean--as it does for Lee--that internally 
the observer is in a physiological state similar to that of -the 
acrobat. It is the same self though, which is ordinarily activated 
through his own activity that is actiTated here where he is merely 
watching someone else engage in overt activity. Lipps then goes on 
to discuss activation of the self where there is no actual movement 
being observed but where movemeut or aoti vi ty is being depicted or 
suggested, as in a picture of a man carr)i~ a heavy load on his 
back. 1 Lipps goes even further than this and claims tla t 1he self' 
can be activated where there is not even a suggestion of something 
actually moving, but activity can be interpreted in the object 
because energies and fbroes seem to be manifest in it. 2 
In all of these oases pleasure is felt as part of the activity 
that takes place in the self. Pleasure resides in the acti vat:i.on of' 
self, the extent to ~ich the quality of self oan be manifested in a 
situation. Pleasure is an inseparable plrt of the activity in the 
same sense as brightness is a qtali ty of color. Lipps explains this 
1 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 143. 
-
2 Ibid., Vol. I, P• 167. 
3 
by the following analogy: Consider a string of a piano or a violin. 
Such a string has certain natural frequencies of vibration which are 
determined by its structure or its nature. If one of these vibra-
tiona is imposed upon it the string will maintain this vibration. On 
the other hand, if some other mode of vibration is given the string 
it will be set into motion but the motion will rapidly die down. 
According to Lipps, then, full activity on one's own part or in 
reacting to something else means activation of the self. This self 
has certain "natural" modes of activity. If' a superimposed activity 
is in agreement with the nature of' the psyche the experience is 
pleasant, if' not it is unpleasant. 
Auch die Seele hat wie die Saite ihr eigentUmliches 
Wesen, ihre eigentUmliohe Or~ia&tion, Konstitution, 
Struktur, kurz ihre eigentUmliche "Natur." 
••• Es gilt der allgemeine Satz: Ein Grund zur 
Lust ist gegeben in dem Masse, als psychische Vorgange--
oder Komplexe von solchen--also Empf'indungen, Wahrneh-
munge~:~~ Vorstellungen, Gedanken und Zusammenhange von 
solohen,der Seele "naturlioh" sind. 1 
B. Self and Self-Activity 
.Although Lipps never really defines what he means either by 
self or activity of 'the self'. an understanding of these should emerge 
from an explication of his whole theory. The oonoept of self-activity 
1 Lipps, Asthetik, Vol. 1, p. 9f. "The soul too has, just as 
the string, its own being. its own organization, constitution, 
structure; in mort, its own nature •••• The following general 
statement is valid: A basis fer pleasure is given by the extent 
to which psychic events--or groups af these--11anely, sensations, 
perceptions, mental images, thoughts and oombinations of these are 
natural for the soul." 
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is at exactly the oe.ater of Lipps' tleary or Ein.f"Uhlung, for there can 
be no experiencing of the activities of another person or object 
without self-activity and, on the other ha:ai, no attribution of 
aotivi ty to the object w jthout selt-aoti vi ty. 
Let us try to olari:f'y this concept of self-activity. The 
word "aoti vi ty" suggests mowment. It might be thought that self-
activity means movEJDBnt of 'the person's body, i.e. overt movement. 
There is certainly reason to believe that overt, physical movemEnt 
of a person involves self-aotivity. When this mvement is done 
intensely or purposefully it is in faot evidence of self-activity. 
To the extent 'that there seems to be a will working it self out in 
the avert activity, there is manifestation or self-activity. But 
although it might be underlying cwert movenents, self-activity in 
its general sense cannot be equated ri th the overt activity of the 
person. We mve already indicated tilat this is 'the case, for self-
activity occurs even when the observer is not <bing anything. It 
occurs 1hrough the contEmplation of aoti vity in som:dhing outside 
the observer. But if "the self is nob identified with the person 
that acts overtly, one might have the impression of the self as an 
independent think-like body functioning inside the person. On the 
basis of "the violin-string analogy-cat might think of the self accord-
ing to Lipps as a system inside the ptrson more or less separate 
from the outside world but which may be set into motion by certain 
forms of excitation. Lee and Munsterberg understand tile manner in 
which a person relates to aesthetic objeots in terms of an internal 
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mechaniSlll which responds in certain ways to certain stimuli. Munster-
berg even identifies this system in psycho-physiological terms. Lipps 
makes no attempt to do this--not because of the limitation of psychology 
at the time he wrote. Rather it is because this "model" of the self 
does not correspond to his gem ra 1 theory. The point is that :fb r 
Lipps, whatever physiological and psychological activit.y may take 
place in the person contemplaii ng an extemal activity, it is in fact 
the external rather than this internal activit.y which is to be under-
stood as the self-activity. 1 How are we then to understand this seem-
inglyparadoxical notion of self-activity? 
The difficulty we encounter hEre is due to our trying to 
separate the ccncept self-activit.y into two entities~ a self and 
activity of this self. .Actually tls two can only be understood 
together. The self' is that qUllity by v.hich an activity becomes 
relevant to a person. The self' comes into being simultaneously with 
its activity. It is not prior to it. The person who exerts great 
effort to move a rook "feels himself pushing. " The verb "feels" has 
here two objects: "himself" and "Pushi~." It is :oot that the self 
exists beforehand and is suddenly activated. Rather the person 
becomes aware of himself as he becomes aware of his pushing and 1his 
suggests that the concept of self is dependent upon that of activity. 
One can, of course, insist that the concept of self is an .!:. priori 
concept ani tlat feeli:cg oneself is an empty idea. But it would then 
1Lipps, "EintUhlung, innere Nachahmung und Organempfindungea," 
trans. M. Schertel and M. Rader, ed. M. Rader, A Modern BoOk of 
Aesthetics, pp. 291-304. 
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be very difficult to introduce a notion of Ein~lung whereby the self 
is extended beyond one 'a body. 
1'o analyze these concepts further we must broaden the notion 
of activity as it occurs in tm phrase self-activity. The standard 
case of self-activity is 1he:t of a man intending w push a rook and 
carrying through his intention. A basic point that Lipps makes is 
that self-activity is manifested not only in the execution of the will 
but also in the frustration o!' tb. e will. J. Thus if a man do as not 
succeed in moving the rook and the forces he exerts are not realized 
in movement we may still speak of self'-aotivity. So activity, first 
of all. does not mean mere movement. What does take place here is 
the exertion of a force and our notion of activity must include at 
least this: 
Ioh meine mit der Tltigkeit in diesem Zusammenhange. 
wie auoh sonst. alles das in mir Erlebbare, das irgendwie 
etwas von Kraft in sioh sohliesst, jede Betatigung oder 
jede Weise des Sichauswirkens einer Kraft oder irgendwelche 
Kratte; ich maine damit alles, in welchem ioh ein solohes 
Siohauswirken einer "Kraft 11 erlebe. 2 
The concept of activity here is a very general one. From the 
restricted notion of movemert we pass to 1he more general one of 
exertion of force. Although we have been giving examples of the 
selt being defined by overt activities and exertion of physical force, 
J.Lipps, Aathetik, Vol. I. p. 99. 
2 Ibid., Vol. II, p. B. 11Imeanwi1h activity in this con-
nection., i'i"Tn general. everything that I can experience that some-
how involves energy, every application cr every manner of carrying 
out a force cr various forces; I mean thereby everything whereby I 
experience such a carrying out of a force. 11 
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this is because that most clearly exemplifies our point. But since 
the self' is more than thatwhioh engages in overt activity (this 
being only one example of self'). the force need not be a physical 
force. Any striving, and in a sense, any feeling will be referred 
to as activity. 
Lipps is not explicit but seems to be conveying the view 
that the self' is the compound of various inner "goings-on" in the 
person. These "goings-on" which define tb9 self' are not merely a 
matter of' tl:B observer receiving various sensations but are more 
abstract processes. They are not, on the other hand, mar ely the 
ideas that one forms about objects 1:ha t he sees. The activities 
that define the self' might be characterized as "telt ideas."1 As 
we shall see, they are abstractions necessary fer 'the cognition of 
objects, but also involve an appropriate feeling tcne. Psyohologi-
oally this feeling tone might be described as a releasing at tensions. 
:f'eelings of expanaion and striving. It is now possible to fbnnulate 
Lipps' notion of self-activity in tile following vray. A person has a 
concept of self Wl.ich is an expression c£ the Self' underlying all 
objects. This concept is not directly accessible to him. It is only 
made accessible by putting it to work, so to speak, in the form of 
activity. Activity is then the means fCI:' the realization of the 
concept of self. There are various types of inner activities that a 
person may experience. The self then is a many-sided concept, for 
1 Ibid., Vol. II, P• 3. 
-
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di:f'ferent self-aoti vi ties may illuminate different aspects of this 
concept. 
MOre important, one's awn realization of self can be enlarged 
by more experience. Indeed, one could interpret the extension of 
the concept of self as essentially the import of -the empathy concept 
for Lipps. The self is extended by application to objects outside 
the person, and as a result the observer experiences in his self 
aspects of Being through the internal activities that the object 
seems to express. It is, perhaps, this participation in the greater 
Reality inherent in every object which is at the base of the pleasure 
of self-aoti vi ty. 
C. Einf'Uhlung am Cognition 
1. Inner ideas 
We have seen that Lipps explains pleasure in the aesthetic 
experience as a queJ.ity of' self-activity. Now we come to the point 
that the concept of self' is also necessary for the very cognition of 
objeots. 1 The concept of self is necessary for cognition since one 
understands an object aesthetically only by asoriblng some aspect of 
the self to it. Let us examine this more carefully. 
There are certain exp.-ienoes which are only known to a person 
as tley occur in himself. They cannot be perceived ottwardly and so 
1 This poi:o:t is not made explicitly by Lipps. What Lipps cb es 
is to illustrate at length (Ibid., Vol. I, pp._l69-204) the role 
played by empathy in grasping the content of visual percepts. 
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the ideas associated with these experiences cazmot be abstracted 
entirely from oneself'. The idea of a finger, for example, is tully 
grasped in terms of' external perception and we can readily conceive 
of' another person having fingers in exactly the same way that we have. 
But the idea of' pride, or sorrow. or anger is not fully grasped qy 
external perception. We have never tully seen these emotions outside 
ourselves and are not capable of abstracting the internal experience 
from ourselves. In order then to understand the expression of' sadness 
in a person's face, :fbr example, the observer must apply the internal 
experience he himself has felt in making such an expression. This 
internal experience is an aspect of' the self' and it is the concept 
derived from this internal experience of sadness which explains the 
external expression for the observer. It should be noted that the 
external expression is not understood by ascribing to it any present 
experience ar: specific memory of' this experience.l. Rather it is the 
abstract concept derived from th 1s experience of' the self which 
explains the expression in t~ object in much the same way tbl.t the 
concept of gravity "explains" the phenomena of falling. In either 
case, one merely collects under one name a large number of' experi-
ences. yet we thi:nk of this as an explanation. This is important 
because it JJ8 ans that the introduction of the notion of self' is part 
ot a person's understanding at hi. a exper iSlce of tile world, his 
cognition of objects. This implies tilat as tar as the observer is 
]. !!!!•• Vol. I, P• 112. 
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concerned there is one Self' tor all objects. It Lipps admitted that 
each object had its own self that could be known objectively then 
the object's meaning would be enth-ely evident i'rom its external 
expression. But his view indicates his prasupposi tion that there is 
an underlying reality which is basically one tor all objects. A 
person can only know his own self as it is expressed in activities, 
but since that which is underlying other objects is a£ the same 
substance he can &!PlY his self to these objects. i.e. he oan apply 
internal ideas to a situation. This attribution or the idea or 
intarml experiences helps one understand a present situation like 
the attribution of the color red to en object helps one umerstand 
it. 
2. Perception of emotions 
There are l'&.rious types ot imur ideas that involve aspects 
of the self'. 
As has already been indio atad in our discussion, emotions 
are some of these internal ideas that must be applied to understand 
the expressions in a person or object. 1 We can never e:q> erienoe 
another person's emotions from bis expression because of the variety 
of' internal changes occurring durhg feelings of' emotion. One then 
cannot understand an emotion exo~t as his amotion. All we can know 
of another parson's emotion is its external :aanifestations. For 
example, when we perceive an expression of' p:-ide on a human face all 
1~ •• Vol. I, P• 107. 
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we can know of the person's pride is its external manifestation, say 
certain movements in the neighborhood at tbJ eye. It is difticul t w 
maintain that the emotion of pride can be tully equated with these 
movements. This emotion almost certainly involves mm.e i:rmer mechanism 
which camot be felt by a person other 1ban the one who lJ1 s the feeling 
of pride. As a. result the emotion of pride has never fully existed 
for one person except in himself. The object has meaning fer him as 
an object of pride only if he applies this concept from himself. We 
see then tlat on one hand the suggestion of emotion in the external 
expression brings forth the idea of 1:b is emotion in the observer. On 
the other hand we cannot unders-tand or fully take cognizance of 'this 
expression without refenoing to its inner source, that is, the emotion 
to which expression is being given. 
3. Perception of forces 
But there are less obvious exauples than that of facial 
expressions depicti~ emotions which illustrate the fact that we 
apply concepts based on our own experience to objects of the world. 
The idea of force is an excellent example c£ this • 1 We can see in 
an object that is perfectly motionless the manifestation of forces. 
But what are the forces? We either see movement or not--neither case 
seems 1x> signify the concept of force. Here, wi til Lipps, we are 
referring not to the physicist's technical, formal concept of :fbrce, 
but rather to the import of this notion in everyday terminology. 
1 Ibid., Vol. I, P• 169ft. 
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Force can be explained as a manifestation of a will. We apply to the 
object the idea of exertion or of will. That is because whenever the 
observer executes a force it is because of his will, so it seems that 
the object 1x>o has a will. For example, in order to understand the 
relationship of a pillar to the building it supports we apply the idea 
of an exertion of energy upward. Otherwise the pillar would have no 
meaning in relation to the build.:ing to wht ch it is contiguous. The 
pillar seems to be manifesting its will beoause it suggests to the 
observer the idea or exertion. This :idea has been abstracted from 
experiences of holding up SODI9 heavy weight and exerting a will to 
keep tb9 arm up with the weight bearing down on it. By aJ;plying the 
concept ot exertion we make connectioDS between different ob jeots in 
order to understand cr "apperceive" them. Every object then can 
potentially be seen as dynamic and alive. 
4. Percept ion of unity 
Forces playing on each other are how 1h e self imposes an order 
upon disparate objects cr on different parts of one object. From a 
more general view it can be said tba t the self brings unity within 
an object so tmt the various parts of ihe object are beheld as one. 1 
Unity itself is therefore a basic inner idea which goes to constitute 
the self and which when appl:is d helps one p eroei ve and understand the 
object. For example, although a tree consists of many components we 
perceive it as having an underlying unity. Is this because the parts 
1 ~., Vol. I, P• 195. 
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are physically attached to one another? Lipps is mt satisfied with 
this answer. The connectedness itself does not constitute unity; 
we still have to impose this concept somehow on the tree, ibr as long 
as the tree is seen as occupying :JBar e than just a point in space 
there is no perceptual unity. 1 .As we have indicated before, regarding 
other types of objects, we must apply some oonoepb to the object to 
bring it together. 'What is the basis of this conceptual unity-? 
Lipps prefaces hiS' own answer as :fbllows: 
Es gibt, dies muss unbedingt festgehalten werden, 
sobleohterdings keine vorstellbare Einheit ausser der 
Einheit die wir in uns erleben. 2 
The unity of the tree is then also based on attributing our 
concept ar self to the tree. There is no contradiction to the unity 
of a person if different parts of our body occupy different parts of 
space. Indeed there is a certain co-ordination between the various 
parts o£ the body aa tba y are seen as belonging to one self. By 
analogy there is no contradiction to the unity of the tree if its 
branches extend in different directions. 
In a manner at speaking we nay say, as Lipps does, tl:a t the 
tree is endowed with life durmg the course of perception. On the 
metaphysical level this refers to the rea.lizatt on of Being in the 
object. On tm psychological cognitive level it means that 1he 
activities of the self are employed to "put the tree together." 
1 ~~ Vol. I, P• 196. 
2 Ibid., p. 19 7. "It must be maintained without qualification 
that there is absolutely no imagillable unity other than the unity we 
exper i e.noe in ourselves. " 
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Lipps claims tbl.t there is a natural tEndency to form 'the analogy 
of the branches of the tree with outstretched arms. A per son under-
stands the connectedness of the tree which connects tbt parts c£ his 
body and applying it to the tree which is reminiscent of his body. 
This process by which we see forces in natural occurrences 
or unity in objects is referred to by Lipps as Ein£1lhlung or Beseelung. 
Einf'Wllung in this specific sense is the application of human concepts 
to explain phenomena which are not directly human experiences. The 
psychological premise is that a person builds up in the course or his 
life a self-centered science in wnich external phenomena are under-
stood in terms of the same concepts as ar:-e internal phenomena. 
To summarize the various stages of attribution, Lipps starts 
with applying to human expressions and movements interpretations of 
the inner feelings that accompany them. 1 He extends this dCM'n to 
inanimate objects wh.ere,al'though there are no feelings accompanying 
its external being, the observer fully understands it only by attrib-
uting to it internal concepts. 2 These internal concepts that are 
called forth and applied have their origins in the observer's 
experience as Being is manifest in himself, but on applying these 
inner concepts to an object the observer does not refer to or 
remember the experiences that contributed to 1he formation of the 
concept. 3 
1 Ibid., Vol. I, P• 105. 
2 Ibid., Vol. I, P• 161. 
-
3 Cf. the discussion regarding the pErception of emotion 
through facial expressions. ~·· Vol. I, P• 112. 
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It should be noted that there are some inanimate objects 
which suggest or express tbt se internal concepts of' to roe, unity 
emotion, etc. better tbln others and these might be considered 
aesthetic objects. 
The unity of' ihese inter~l concepts are wl'at constitute tbt 
self' tcr Lipps. He never nakes clear just b:>w th eq are held together. 
He is more interested in showing how these various inner ideas 
function, how they are applied in order to be able to interpret 
the world. Not all things which might be considered inner ideas 
form whlt Lipps calls the selt. Intellectual reasoning, tor example, 
occurs upon perceiv.i.ng objects and is in tact the most obvious 111ay 
to explain relations in wl'a t is seen. But Lipps, in tact, goes to 
pains to point out that intellectual understanding is not an example 
of' Einf'Uhlung.J. Lipps bases his point ot view in this connection on 
the tact that we never speak of "feeling ou- selves think:." Thi:cking 
is somehow not a feeling process. There are a number of possible 
explanations for this. It may be tb.a. t tile selt is to be confined to 
those inner ideas which somehow involve a carrying out of' an intention 
or a will. From this point of' view the concept of self' conveys the 
notion of' participation in a f'orm of' Being. Or there may be a purely 
psychological distinction between the inner activity of' intellectual 
thought and the inner activity oo nnected with emotions or with 
J. ~., Vol. I, P• 125, and Vol. II, P• 11. 
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striving. In the latter there are actual physical sensations that 
are felt in the ordinary sense but then sensations are too diffuse 
to be localized. The thinking process. on the other band• involves 
no physical sensations and in a certain sense. therefore. is not 
actually experienced. Lipps. however. seams to incline to the first 
explanation. In drawing the distinction between the intellectual 
judgment and other "self-activities" he points to the fact that the 
former came to us effortlessly and wi ihout involving any inner~ 
forces. 1 
The process of Einf'Uhlung occurs because the only self the 
observer knows is himself. The experiences that go to make up 1h e 
substance of his concept of self are his experiences. As a result • 
when this concept is applied to explain connections outside himself• 
it is still the same concept which is applied to connections within 
oneself. This results in the dual character of the Einftthlung 
concept for Lipps: we endow the inanimate object with life {we 
apply our self to it to make it understandable in human terms) and 
we participate in that life. i.e. the self-activities that are needed 
to bring meaning to the object. Thus our self that is activated 
through the perception of the object projects outward to 'the object 
and imvard to tha observer. 'lb.e experience becomes one. 
D. Relationship between Philosophical 
and Psychological Approaches 
Lipps has devoted most of his philosophical discussion to 
1 Ibid •• Vol. II• P• 12. 
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presenting examples of situations of varying degrees of complexity in 
which the object takes on meaniDg thro tgh i:he application of the self 
concept. 1 His metaphysical presuppositions can be inferred from his 
view that the appuoent. material. or exter~l reality is mt self-
explanatory but that there is a greater internal reality about vh ich 
one must have k:nowle dge in cr der to understand the external aspects 
of objects. Otherwise. Lipps could explain the branches of trees., 
for example, as a physical c:nncept. But he doesn't. Our interpreta-
tion is that he sees them expressive of some inner reality. Ther-e is 
underlying the visible tree a reality not redU)ible to any physical 
concepts. This Reality is common to both people and objects., to the 
animate ani inanimate. There is a unity between what seem to be 
disparate selves., for underlying the variety there is a basic substance 
of which all selves partake. By experiencing his own self then the 
observer is able to participate in thi. s Reality underlying every-
thing. He can interpret all objects through the basic e~erieme of 
thjs Reality in himself. Every object expresses this Reality but 
the observer can only realize this by attributing the concepts of 
his awn self to the object. A rock can become alive and express its 
Being for the observer only if the observer realizes that which the 
rook suggests (e.g. a :fb roe dannmrd) from his own experience, by 
applying his C1Nn self to tile object. 
That 'the objects of the world have an essential nature which 
1 Ibid., Vol. I. PP• 169-204. 
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is nat reducible to physical concepts is a p:"emise which Lipps shares 
with Husserl. 1 Lipps also mares with tm pheno:monologists the view 
that this essen1i al. nature must be directly experienced. 
When I see the sculptured image ar a man in the act 
of rising, tbt sense-feelings which a real man would have 
who thus arises, do not exist fer my esthetic contempla-
tion, any more than my own sense-feelings so exist. What 
I immediately intuit in the plastic form is its willing, 
the p<7Rer, the pride. Only this lies for my contemplation 
immediately in the contemplated object. And to the 
esthetic object belo:rgs absolutely nothing but what lies 
immediately in the object of contemplation. The thought 
that also the sense-feelings would unquestionably appear 
in such a man if he were a real man, is an ingredient 
added by my reflection. 2 
Where Lipps would take is sue with the phenomenologists is in 
the question ar the nature of 'f:'.m essences that uDierlies the objects 
of experience. In Lipps there is just a single essence, -the Self 
that pervades the objects of the world. All si gnificanoe and meaning-
fulness in nature is reducible w the single phenomenon of life--or 
equivalently• the self which seeks l:ii'e. "Die Natur is uns uoerall 
lebendig. Uberall, wie gasagt, sehen wir Ak:ti vi tat, Passivit•at, 
Streben. Tun, Erleiden. ,a PJ:um.ome:oolcgy, on the o'ther hani, allows 
for a variety of phenomena co:rrespoDiing to the various forms of 
experience. 
It should be emphasized that there is a certain tension in 
~. Parl Welch, Edmum Husserl 's Phenomenology (Los .Angeles: 
The University of Southern California Press. 1939). 
2 Lipps,uEinttthlungtinnere Naohahmung, und Organempfindungen,• 
in M. Rader, Modern Book of Aesthetics. 
3tipps, Asthetik, Vol. I, P• 163. 
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Lipps. JJ.though the observer refers to his own eJq?erienoe to explain 
an object this does not mun that he is re-li~ng any past or present 
emotional state. This would ualiB Lipps ' view an associationist view, 
as we shall f'ini Lee's view to be. Rather the e:x:periem es he refers 
to are the f'o rms of' Being in himself' am the feeling that occurs f'or 
Lipps is not then a physio-psychologica.lly based experience. It has 
what might be called an existential :rreaning. It is the realization 
or awareness of the forms of Being. Lipps might describe this 
realization as involving feelings of' strivixg, expansion and f'ulf'ill• 
me:ct and what sounds like a release of' tensions. Although this sounis 
as if he is describing psychological activities 'iilich we automatically 
assume to be grounded in a neuro-physiologm al system, Lipps is not 
using these terms to indicate this. Rather this is the way he can 
describe the eJq?erience of' the realization of' the forms of Being in 
the self'. We can tbi:ck: or this eJ~Perienoe or realization occurring 
in ourselves as a result of' our participating in some activity. But 
the crux of' Lipps ' argument is that this awareness also occurs in us 
by observing oiber objects and realizing the fbrms of' being in them 
which. as has been indicated, is possible beoause of the underlying 
unity in all thixgs. 
The Gestal tist view as expressed by Rudolph Armeim can by 
contrast help us underst8.Ild. the self aspect or Lipps' thought. 
Arllh.eim reels that there are underlying structures or patterns in 
the 1KI"ldwhich are e::xpressed in every object. 1 ThEre are then 
1Rudolph Arnheim, Art am Visual Perception, Introduction. 
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inherent in the visual pattern of an object expressive qualities wb.iah 
are peroeived ilmn.ediately. Since the object is perceived as a whole 
the underlying stru:sture as expressed through this individual object 
is self-evident. For Lipps the underlying Reality expressed in an 
object can only be realized by ref'en-ing it to tile self' of the observer. 
In some ways Lipps is actually very close U> Arnheim sim e the self' 
is not a personal self fer Lipps in the sense that the observer is 
experiencing something exclusive to his OW'n cumulative experience. 
Rather the observer is applying the objective categories of' Being to 
the object. His self' attomatioally becomes involved because he can 
only understand the objective categories in his own self'. Both f'or 
Arnheim and Lipps the objects are expressions of' some objective 
reality. For Lipps this objective Reality can only be understood by 
channeling this Reality thro~h the observer's self'. This produces 
the psychological experiences Lipps has described but is grounded in 
the realization of Being rather than in any definable psychological 
system. 
There is throughout Lippa' discl.llsion a certain tension between 
wba.t might be called the mturalistic descriptions and mystical pre-
suppositl. ons of his aesthetic. On one hand he goes to great lengths 
to explain and describe what goes on in the person in perceiving 
various types of objects. These "goings on" or psycholog:ic a1 experi-
ences of tile inner ideas help define the self'. But on the other hand 
these psychological activities do not entirely define -the self • i.e. 
the self is not reducible to these activities. Although these 
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actiT.lties are what the concept of self means for the observer and 
should be understood as thoroughly as possible, the self is not just 
the sum total of the activities. There is an indefinable dimension 
to the self which goes beyond the psychological .f'unotioning of ihe 
inner ideas. Lipps can be interpreted in this way because he 'WO.:ats 
to apply the self' to other objects and not to see it as something 
which only oecurs in the individual observer. The self therefore is 
a state of Being applicable to all objects. As has been discussed, 
it manifests itself' in tm observer's consciousness -through what we 
have t armed the "inner ideas." The psychological processes are 
expressions of Being in the observer so that for Lipps the psycho-
logical processes can tit into his Idealistic framework. They are 
subsumed umer them. They can only explain matters to a certain 
point beyond ~iOh Lipps must posit -the mystical Self. 
Lipps does try to eJq?lain the psydlolog:fo al processes to some 
degree and does not make it an entirely mystical process. On the 
otb3r hand he stops shcrt of the poi:ct where the psychological process 
can be made into a mechanistic principle where, for e.:xample, physio-
psychological processes might be auto:n:ati.cally called forth in 
relation to certain external stimuli. 
'l'b.e psychological analysis in Lipps las this significanceS 
It explaiDS why the concept or self' that a person formulates cannot 
be abstracted from his person. This means that a per son can haTB 
only one concept of self, and not a separate self concept for each 
object perceived. 'l'b.is is crucial for Lipps because this implies 
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that when the self is seen as active in an external object, it :is the 
same self' that is active in personal experiences. This is the means 
by which the person participates in the activity of an external 
object. 
It is interesting to see how Lipps ' theoretical framework of 
Eint'Uhlung is reduced in Lee (who is not really involved in Idealist 
presuppositl.ons) tD a machanical, psychological response which takes 
place au'b:>matically as a result of specific causes and effects. 
A! 'though. Lee negates her earlier physiologically based aesthetioJ. 
for one which she feels to be more like Lipps' tb; ory, her view of 
Eint'Uhlung is not based on the premise of the realization of Being in 
the W<rld but on the question of the perception of dynamic qualit:J8 S 
in objects. Th:is is one aspect of Lipps' integrated view, but his 
view is involved with the entire relationship between man and objects 
of the world. Lee develops th:is one aspect to understand aesthetic 
perception. 
J.vernon Lee, "The Central Problem of .Aesthetics," translated 
into German in "Zeitsohrit't :f.'1ho Aesthetik," 1910, and included in 
Beauty and Ugliness am Other Stu:lies. Here Vernon Lee repudiates 
her physiologic any based aesthet;ic in the essay "Beauty and Ugliness," 
and attributes responsibility for this mistaken view to mr collab-
orator, c. Anstruther-Thomson. The latter eisay also appears in the 
collection Beauty a.u:l Ugliness and other Studies. 
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CHAPTER II 
VERNON LEE 
A. The Process ot Aesthetic Perception 
For Lee empathy is basically a matter of visual perception. 
In tact, all objects are perceived according to Lee through e. kind 
ot empathic process. The observer attributes his reactions in per-
ceiving an object to the object ot perception. 1 We shall interpret 
Lee as saying that this general principle applies to all objects, 
the aesthetic object being a special case or this principle. 
In objects which portray movement or are moving it is obvious 
that one attributes movement to it as one attributes red to the 
sensation of red, but Lee'e basic concern is not with the object 
which portrays moTeaUnt, nor does she believe as does Lipps or 
.A.rllheim, that there is an innate expression o~ acti"f'ity' in the 
object. There are no activities or movemeuts going on, so Lee 
must ask: why iD&nimate objects, lifeless lines, can seem to be 
more dynamic a.DCl movi:og than actual moving objects. 2 The answer 
is that the observer attributes to the objeot not only that 'Which 
1 Lee, Beau5t and Ug1iness, PP• 17-23. 
2 Ibid., PP• 354-356; also PP• 111-115 in her discussion of 
Bernard Berenson where She emphasizes the distinction between move-
ment in repr.esettted objects and lines which express movement 
unconnected with representation. 
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corresponds to specific sensations in the object but also what we 
haTe referred to as illusory qualities. The quality of movement in 
an inanimate object is such an illusory quality. 
1. Basic principle ot aesthetic perception 
This attribution ot what we have called primary and secondary 
sensations (or qualities corresponding to something in the object and 
illusory qualities) is founded on what one might deduce as Lee's basic 
principle ot perception. This principle then, includes the perception 
ot both these types ot qualities. Lee does not explicate this prin-
ciple at any length but it seems to be at the core ot her aesthetic. 
binding the various aspects ot her theoey together. She has referred 
to it as "the merging of the perceptive activities of the subject 
in the quality ot the object ot perception. nl. The constitution of 
the object as tar as the observer is concerned is to be equated with 
the totality ot the observer's experience in perception of the objeot. 
The observer's only knowledge of the objeot (which comes immediately 
with perception) is the way it atteots him. This becomes the detini-
tion of the object tor him. For example. one sees a rose to be red. 
One doesn't talk in terms ot one's reactions to the object. One 
doesn't say "My reaction to the rose is tba t it is red" but rather 
assumes one's reactions to be equivalent to the object and simply 
says "The rose is red. 11 thereby making an inversion. 2 But there are 
~ernon Lee. The Beautitul. p. 63. 
2 Ibid •• P• 58. 
-
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many things going on simultaneously in tbe observer. The sensation of 
the shape of the rose, the color c£ the rose, associations to one's 
experience w.i:th the rose as a flower. All of i:hese experiences togeth-
er contribute to one's cognition of an object. The m.ture am complex-
ity of the object depem on what is going on in t~ cb server during 
perception. The process going on is lU>l"e complex in relation to same 
objects than to others. As we shall see later., what "goes on" in the 
observer during perception of aesthetic objects is at least in part 
the reliving of past activity and the idea of this activity is per-
cei ved in the object alongside wii:h i:h e other charactEristics 'that 
make up tm aesthetic object. 1 
Lee indio ates her gene:ral perceptive principle in the following: 
It would no more occur to me 'that the movements were in 
my mind than it would occur to ne that, except as a result 
of scientific teaching that which I call color is a phenom-
enon taking place in my eye am nerves or that which I cal 1 
a musical tone is similarly not in the vibrating body or the 
air but in my own organs of perception. 
In other w<rds tis se qualities are, in my case thought 
of and perceived as really existing in the external shape or 
object however much my reason tells me that a motionless 
object or a mere two or three dimensional form cannot be 
performing any of 'the actions whU,h I attribute to it. 2 
Illusory q'lali ties as well as qualities which correspond to specific 
sensations can be perceived in the object because beth are a result 
of something going on in the observer and what goes on in the observer 
during perception of an object appears to go on in the object. a 
1Vernon Lee., Beauty and Ugtiness, p. 53. 
2~ ... p. 102r,. 
~e, The Beautiful, P• 113f. 
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For example, in relation to the illusicn of lines moving in an inanimate 
object Lee sayst 
Such movement of lines we have seen to be a scheme 
of activity suggested by our own activity in taking stock 
of a two-dimensional shape; an Mea or feeling of acti v-
ity which we, being normally m:taware of its origin in 
ourselves, project into the Sl.ape trecisely as we project 
our sensation of red from our own eye am mind into the 
object which has deflected the rays of light in such a 
way as to give us that red sensati. on. 
The psychological basis for this perceptive principle is, as has been 
mentioned, the non-localizable character of many sensations and feel-
ings. If a person oan locate a sensation in himself' such as the 
sting of a bee then "bhis sensation is recognized as occurring in his 
body and not in any othEr object. If he feels himself in motion than 
he recognizes this as his activity ani not the activity of any other 
object but there are feelings and activities that tam place in the 
person which he cannot locate because of their complexity. Then he 
tends to objectify his feelings in the object of which he is most 
conscious and aware of at the moment. 1 
2. Lee's original kinaesthetic view of perception 
In the original essay on 'ileauty and Ugliness" (in collaboration 
with c • .Ansrutii.er -Thomson), Lee proposed that the activities going on 
in the observer in reaction to an aesthetic object could be explained 
in terms of physiological activities. Lee held a kinaesthetic point 
of view whereby the observer e:x:per ienced bodily aotivi ty; muscular and 
1 Lee, Beauty and Ugiiness, pp. 30, 53. 
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respiratory aoti'rlty in tm perception of an object and 1he object 
was then perceived in terms of tmse activities. For example, 
acoOl"ding to this 'theory if' there was an expansion of 1:he lu:cgs in 
reaction 1» an art object the object could be perceived ani described 
as "expansive." Later Lee negated her early kinaesthetic views 
based on a James-Lange theory c£ emotion for a view whereby a more 
abstract process takes place in the observer. "The phenomenon at 
EinfUhlung [then] ••• can be explained by reference to merely 
ment; al phenomenon. nl. 
It is than obvious from the discuasion of perception that the 
attribution at activities to 'the art object is not added to the 
process of perceiving the shape but ratmr 'ijlis is 1he way the 
observer perceives the shape. Association takes place instantane-
ously. 
According to.Listowel2 this had been noticed by Robert 
Visoher, one of 1he first psychologists to apply scientific methods 
to aesthetics--that the attribution of aesthetic qualities appears 
to take place instantaneously upon perception. This idea was also 
used by Stern to counter anti-assooie.ticnist theories of e.estmtios 
which felt that the reflection involved in associating, calling forth 
l.Ibid. ~ P• 821. 
2Earl of Listowel, Critical History of Modern Aesthetics, 
PP• 54-57. Listowel here discusses RObert Visoher's Uber de.s 
aptische For.mgerttbl {Leipzig: He~ Credner, 1873), and P. 
Stern's "Einf'Uhl.ung und Association in der ~sthetik," 
Beitrage zur Asthetik, Bd. V, ed. Lipps and Weiner, 1898. 
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past memories would require too long a time and be too conscious a 
process. 
Although we have given some indications as to what di:f'f'eren-
tiates attribution to the aesthetic object from the non-aesthetic 
one we have as yet to analyze what Lee means by the art object and 
what she means by the activity of' tbe observer that is attributed to 
the art object. 
She calls her philosophy a •formal-dynamic" aesthetic.1 
"Dynamic • as we shall see i a essential to her view of empathy as the 
attribution of activity to the object. But this idea of formal-
ampatey ostensibly souncls quite incongruous since in popular thought 
we usually thillk of empathizing or identifying with the human element 
in the story or content of a work of art, and Vernon Lee seems to be 
advocating an empathy with the formal elements of visual objects, 
the lines, colors, etc. If we think of empathy though, as part of 
the cognitive process as discussed above there is no problem of 
empathizing with the formal aspects of an object. One can attribute 
the qualities which tit with the .fbrmal elements of an object as one 
can attribute emotions to an object of human content. Let us see 
how Lee integrates the formal elements into her system as a whole. 
3. The three levels of perception 
According to Lee there are three levels of perception. 
fhere are tbe simple sensations which are taken in passively, 
1Lee, Beauty; and Ugliness, P• 353. 
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i.e. they do not demand any effort of attention on the part of the 
observer. For example, a strong smell overwhelms one and is sensed. 
!he only activity tm t has to take place i a the basic .functioning 
of the senses; there is no particular activity outside this. 1 In 
direct contrast to this is the second level of perception where the 
object brings about a very definite activity on the part of the 
observer in relation to the object. Here the observer attributes 
to the object among other qualities that o:t the purpose and :f\motion 
it playa in relation to the observer's life. The observer must do 
-
something or not do some~ing in relation to the object but be does 
not on this level of perception merely contemplate it. 2 
!he aesthetic level of perception stands in contrast to the 
practical and simple-sensation levels discussed above. What takes 
place here are not simple sensations but a group or combination of 
sensations in relation to each other. These cannot be "taken in" 
but in order to be perceived connections must be made between the 
various sensations. These connections involve some kind of activit.f 
on the part of the observer. We shall see the complex :nature of this 
activity later. 3 The important thing for the present is that there 
are three levels of perception to which can be applied Lee '• "per-
ceptive principle~ !he aesthetic level seems to stand between the 
1 ~·· PP• 22-29. 
2 Thid., PP• 8-13. 
-
3 Ibid., PP• 29-34. 
simple sensations where there is no active involvement on the part ot 
the observer and the practioal lenl where involvement leads to overt 
action. In the aesthetic si ttation, on one hand, the attribution of 
qualities of purpose and tunotionwhich would lead to overt action is 
inhibited but, on the other hand, in order to experience the aesthetic 
object the observer must by some inter:nal activities make the connec-
tions between the sensations. It is in relation to this view--that in 
order to have cognition of an object some activity must take place on 
the part of the observer--that Lee ia closest to Lipps, but it also 
indicates the artificiality of their connection because the inner activ-
ities llhich make sense out of objects for Lipps are the applying ot 
universal categories which for Lee it is applying that Vthich is 
abstracted from the observer's past personal eJq?eriences. 
B. The Aesthetio Object 
1. 'Shapes" and tceb.ings" 
Lee calls tbe object of the third aesthetic level of perception 
"shapes" and of the second practical level of perception "things." 
Shapes are abstract geometric fbrms; they are not recognized as any-
thing that serves any function or means anything other than a relation-
ship of lines and colors. They are basically spatial figures in 
relationship to other spatial figures. The observer, by concentrating 
on these qualities, inhibits attribution of qualities of function and 
purpose which would make the "shape" into a "thing." The aesthetic 
object as shape is contemplated for its own intrinsic 110rth as a spatial 
figure and not for anything beyond this. But these abstract, geomet-
trical figures are not independent creations. They are what visually 
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go into ma.k:i~ up the objects of the world. Those objects which serve 
as functions f'or something outside tb.an.sel ves are "things. • The "shape" 
or art object are then aspects of' the "thing 11 or practical object. 1 
"The word beautif'Ul implies the satisfaction derived from the contem-
plation not of' things but of aapects. 112 
In order to perceive an object aesthetically the observer will 
concentrate on the geometrical fol'Dl in the object a:cd ignore what the 
object represents or for what it can be used. For example, one doesn't 
aesthetically perceive a house as a place of shelter. Rather one 
might concentrate upon tile triangular shape of' the pointed roof. The 
house itself though is not ignored. The "thing," the non-aesthetic 
aspects are necessary to bring one's attention to the "shape." First 
one is attracted to the house as a house but then upon looking at ~t 
one gets involved in concentrating upon the triangular shape of' the 
roof. It is the house which directs your attention to the shape since 
aesthetic empathy is constantly interspersed with the non-aesthetic• 
the sh~pe with the thing. 3 However, during the process of aesthetic 
empathy the observer views the object as divorced from the thing. 
Artistic contemplation is a combination usually a 
rapid and so to speak, contrapuntal al tarnation of many 
other mental processes with the particular one we have 
called Aesthetic Empathy, such aesthetic empathy never 
1 Ibid., PP• 14-19. 
2 Ibid., P• 19. 
3 Ibid., PP• 90-97. 
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arising except where the attention has been directed on 
to given visual, audible or verbal forms by some of the 
dozen practical uses, emotional needs and intellectual 
interests which press into their service or accidentally 
appeal to the eye, the ear and the habit of speech. 1 
In dif:f'erentiati:Dg .further that which characterizes the 
aesthetic from the non-aesthetic, the "shapes• from the "things," 
Lee feels that the perception of a thing requires information that 
~u cannot gain from the perception of the object. This is infor-
mation that you can only gain from knowing about the object in 
other contexts. For example, if you see the chair in the picture 
of Van Gogh 'a bedroom and attribute to it the qualities of "chair 
that can be sat upon, and belonging to Van Gogh," you are involving 
information from other experiences, that of the purpose of chairs 
and that this is Van ~ogb. 's room and therefore his chair. But it 
you see the chair as a certain relation of geometrical forms it does 
not involve knowledge outside the shapes themselves, "knowledge 
which the shapes themselves do not afford. 112 
It is because of this that Lee feels that "shapes" are two-
dimensional while one of the characteristics of a thing is its cubic 
dimension, its ~hree-dimensional aspeot. 3 The cubic dimension 
involves knowledge which the shapes in themselves do not afford. 
One infers experiences unrelated to the perception, the seeing of 
the object. In recognizing a three-dimensional object one infers 
1 Lee, Beauty and Ugliness, P• 363. 
sa~., P• 113. 
3 Ibid., PP• 84-89. 
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locomotor experience, the object is seen with the knowledge of how 
it is if seen from a change of place or position. For example, one 
infers what one knows about a house; that if we would walk around 
to the side oft he house we would see that it recedes backwards. But 
the shapes thEIIlsel ves do not tell this. This does not mean that 
pictures dra'Wll in perspeoti ve are unrelated tb art, for although the 
three-dimensional aspect is nat the aesthetic part the shapes may 
well be found in a three-dimensional picture, the three-dimensionality 
of it making the picture more interesting in general and more capable 
of drawing the observer's attention to the shapes, the two-dimensional 
sensation-relationships of the object. 
Once the observer is brought to concentrate upon the "shapes a· 
the makeup of the shapes themselves is to enclose the observer 's 
attention in tbe object because the sbe.pe has a "reiterative char-
acter." it directs the activity of the eye back upon itself so that 
the observer is held entirely in contemplation of the various sense 
relationships of the shape. 1 Lee's implication is that the eye's 
attention is held better by shapes than when an object is seen as a 
"thing" where cultural associations might distract the observer from 
the object itselt. 
2. The universal character of "shapes" 
Paradoxically the experience of perceiving a shape, although it 
requires limiting one's point of view in regard to what is seen, is 
1Ibid., P• 14-11. 
-
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richer and deepW. than that of perceiving a "thing." The "thing• 
represents something specific whose associations are fairly limited 
and demanding of certain actions toward it. The "shape" for exa.mple, 
ot triangle and the activities that occur in perceiving it can be 
applied to all possible e:xperienoes of triangle. The question arises 
though that since shapes are aspects of things, why can't one see the 
shape as one looks at the thing? Why does the thingness of the 
object have to be illhibited in order to perceive the shape with its 
universal character? This is because in perceiving an object the 
observer is attempting to understand it an:l grasp it in terms most 
readily available, the object's more striking aspects. The understand-
ing or graspil'lg of a thing means understanding how the thing functions, 
how you are to relate to the object. This relationship to the object 
as a function shuts ott the object from being understood as shape. 
It inhibits the ability to see the shape simultaneously as one reacts 
to the thing. 
In contrast to this when dealing with sb:l.pe the only way of 
understanding 1 t is by finding connections between the different parts 
of shape itself rather than connecting the shape with the observer or 
with something else. The observer makes these connections by means 
ot geometric ideas. 1 These ideas come from the collection of past 
experiences having in common this specific idea ot movement. 
It seems that the "shape" with its abstract character is the 
1 . flli•, P• 38. 
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fitting object of aesthetic contemplation for Lee because it most 
directly brings forth the idea of movement in the observer. The 
11shape" corresponds to activity because visually movement can be 
considered a geometric idea; it fbllows a certain pattern of points 
and lines. Originally Lee felt that the activity which connected 
the points and lines was the actual activity of the eyes and that 
this movement gave rise to a specific feeling of movement which was 
synonymous with bodily activity. But Lee later repudiated the 
kinaesthetic aspect of this theory and also felt taL t the eye move-
menta are not varied enough to account for the subtle differences 
between shapes. The eyes though could suggest abstract ideas of 
movement.J. 
3. The idea ot movement in the object 
derived from memories of activity 
The limited eye movements could not explain the variety of 
movements seen in an aesthetic experience. Also the activities of 
the eye could :aot explain the pleasure in the aesthetic experience. 
Lee wanted a more refined idea of "shape 11 perception, of movement to 
connect the sensations, so she developed the view that the eye move-
menta and bodily parts connected wi tb. adjusting the eyesight bring 
forth the idea. of Movement in general which enables the memories of 
past movements to be associated with the shape. The memories of these 
past movements is what is attributed to the object in order to eJQ?lain 
1 Lee, Beauty and Ugliness, P• 355. 
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for Lee the qualities of movement in inanimate objects. But these 
memories of activity are not memories of specifio activities; for 
example, the observer stretching upward in this place at that time. 
Rather they are the residue of cctmtless past actiTities. That which 
is attributed to tbs object is the idea of movement taken from one's 
memories of all past movements that are associated with the present 
act of percept;ion. :&. It is this idea of movement rather than the 
actual eye movements which connects the points and lines together 
and which unifies it into a "shape. • 
It should be noted that ideas for Lee are not Ideas in a 
Platonic sense as they are in a sense for Lipps. ~ey are part of 
the psychological process and do not stand for a greater reali~ 
outside the psychological process. 
Lee refers to the re-living of past activities as the awaken-
ing of dynamic dramas in man. She characterizes the Whole process as 
the attribution of our awn modes of d:ynamic experience 
to the shapes whose perception is a result not JDSrely of 
the bodily activity of our eyes but of the "mental" ••• 
activities of measuring, comparing, combining of the 
visual data and is accompanied by the reviTisoenoe of 
motor experience as distinguished from masoul.ar aeua• · 
tiona in what we oall our mind.2 
NO actual muscular sensations have to take place for in Lee's 
later aesthetic motor the idea or activities have replaced muscular 
sensations. There might nevertheless be people who may actually feel 
muscular reactions to a work or art but these kinaesthetic reactions 
1 Lee, The Beauti~ P• 64. 
2 Lee, Beauty and Ugliness, p. 143. 
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are secondary and are not tbe way we perceive the object. They occur 
only af'ter the perception and attribution of dynamic qualities to the 
art objeot. 1 
c. The Centrality of the Concept 
of Activity in Lee's Aesthetic 
.Activity or movement then is the center of Lee's aesthetic 
from which emerge the various aspects of her aesthetic. The movement 
attributed to the object is defined by the idea of activity felt in 
the observer; the aesthetic object comprises the fonnal characteris-
tics of the object which are taken in most simply and directly by the 
activities of the e~ and become interpreted in terms of ideas of 
aoti vities associated with it. Why, though,is activity or moYement 
so central to Lee? Why does she identit.y her aesthetic so strongly 
with "dynamic" and "active"? She does not. as Lipps does. deal with 
aot"tal movements, for example, of acrobats or dancers. Rather she is 
interested in the quality and feeling of movement in the seemingly 
static lines and shapes. Possibly it is because this quality of 
activity or movement distinguishes the living from the non-living. 
Heightened activity is life-enhancing. This heightened activity, it 
can be deduced, occurs for Lee in the aesthetic realm of perception 
rather than the practical realm which ostensibly might seem to be the 
more active, because aesthetic perception can call upon the totality 
of experiences of a past activity of the observer (and possibly 
experiences of the race too). Practical activity is limited to 
1Ibid., P• 367. 
-
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specific acts in relation to specific situations. Therefore associ-
a tiona with a practical object must be relevant here and now. The 
aesthetic object goes beyond any specific time-and-place situation 
and can be associated with an activity as it has occurred in all times 
and places. Also, once a practical activity is completed the attention 
of the observer is diverted to another objeot, but in perceiving a 
"shape" one can re-live the activity in the mind over and over again. 
In fact, part of the characteristics of the •shape• is that it is 
reiterative. It brings the attention of the observer baok to it 
again and again. 
Raving emphasized the special role of activity in Lee's 
theory, we can look upon her distinctions between shapes and things 
in a different light. Up until now we have seen the distinction in 
that •shapes" can call forth a vast store of memories, whereas ttthings" 
by the immediacy of their nature are more restrictive in their associ-
ations. But can't "things• too call forth chains ot association and 
can't we imagine tba t in the oontempla tion ot a "thing a an observer 
will also be involved in a drama ot some kim? Would Lee consider 
this a limited aesthetic experience or would it not be an aesthetic 
experience at all? In seeking an answer to these questions we realize 
that the special role played by shapes is due to the special nature of 
movement memories. Lee postulates that the memories of movement exist 
at a more accessible level ot consciousness than other memories: 
Einf'mllung is a mere regrouping ot senses of movement 
which are forever present in our consciousness, indeed 
which seem to form its woot. Feelings ••• of dynamic 
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conditions and attractions are among the immediate. the 
primary data of our psychic life. 1 
Lee speaks as if the senses of movement in the observer are 
so basic to his makeup that movements might be thought of as part of 
the very mechanism of perception. The result is that ideas of 
movements form a. part of the process of perception. On the other 
hand. other memories are recalled after tbe object bas already been 
perceived. Therefore they are no lon~r felt in the object and 
their experience is of a different nature than the aesthetic experi-
ence. 
D. Aesthetic Pleasure 
There is a basic similarity between the sources of aesthetic 
pleasure for Lipps and for Lee. For both the pleasure consists in 
living and in being active through perceiving the object. But for 
Lipps this activity is a present calling forth of universals but does 
not have to relate to some personal experiences of one's own. while 
for Lee the activity of the observer is being re-lived. Similarly. 
Whereas for Lipps the beauty of the aesthetic object depends upon the 
pleasantness of the present experience. for Lee it depends on the 
pleasure of past experiences which are being recalled. 
"Aesthetic" for Lee ean be equated with activity". or more 
precisely. with the re-living of activity in the mind of the observer. 
In some oases "shapes" awaken in the observer movements or memories 
1Lee. Beauty and Ugliness. P• 83. 
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of past movements which have pleasant e.ssooia 'ti ons to tll. e observer 1 
e.nd some shapes correspond to activities which, when re-lived in the 
mind of 1m observer, are felt to be unplee.sant. 1 (A "thing" of 
course does not bring forth tls aesthetic e.oti vi ty tll.e.t e. shape does, 
so that there is no problem of confusing the unpleasant of the "thing" 
and the uuplee.se.nt of the "shape. • For the uupleasantness of the 
"shape" refers only to "the associations with movement, 'While tbe 
"thing" brings in other cultural associations.) 
One's aesthetic pr eferenoe will depend upon whether the shape 
brings forth memories of e.oti vi ties which are felt to be pleasant or 
uuplee.se.nt. The pleasant, of course, are preferred to the unpleasant. 
The implication here is that if in perceiving e. shape there are brought 
about unpleasant memories in tbe observer this will still be consistent 
with the aesthetic nature of the experience. For Lee as well as fbr 
Lipps both beauty and ugliness depend upon having an aesthetic experi-
ence in the first place, i.e. as long e.s there is a pleas'lre-dis-
pleasure alternative it can be considered aesthetic if the other 
conditions set forth apply. Lee felt that one can perceive something 
as aesthetic but yet not enjoy it fb r it doesn't bring forth pleasant 
associations. That might imply that living fully or intensely as one 
does in the life-eDhancing aesthetic e:xperience is not; necessarily 
pleasant. 
Just as Sl'J!IPathy with the grief of o\r neighbors 
implies in ourselves knowledge at 'the conflicting states--
1 Ibid. I P• 17. 
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hope, resignation, pain and the efforts against pain--
Which constitute similar grief in our own experience; 
so the aesthetic attribution ot our own dynamic modes 
to visible forms implies the realization in our con-
sciousness ot the various oonflioti strains and 
pressures • • • Italics mine 
In this way Lee might be answering the problem as to haw one could 
find aesthetic the portrayal of the crass or ugly. One experiences 
the ugliness but there are other conditions, e.g. that it is per-
ceived empathioally as a dynamic configuration of' lines, that make 
it an aesthetic experience. 
Lee claims that the observer receives pleasure from the 
revival of past activities insofar as the activity in relation to 
.the shape is "favorable to our existence. 112 What makes an object 
"favorable to our existence"? Lee has indicated that the idea of 
movement was pleasurable it it had pleasant associations and from 
the "favorable to our existence" idea Lee implies that movements 
have pleasant associations it they in some way enable man to adapt 
to life better. We interpret "adapting to lite 11 in the following 
wa.7t Activity or movement is essentially ot practical value. It 
denotes a change in the state of man and environment. If' this change 
benefited man's survival it would have pleasant associations am be 
"favorable to our existence ~t if' it indicated a change which 
threatened man "UUl was unfavorable to man's fight for survival it 
was found as unpleasant. 
1 ~., P• 20. 
a~., P• 21. 
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It is interesting then that in spite of the formal aspects 
of Lee's aesthetic, according to this interpretation, the roots of 
her aesthetic are in the practical world. Activity is so central. 
because activities occurring from the minute a person is born threaten 
or enhance his survival. 
E. Concluding Remarks on Lee's Theoey 
.U though Lee shows how "activity" is connected with man 'a 
relationship w the world it is :not clear how re-living of activities 
in the mind fits in with the general psychic makeup of the observer. 
It seems that this experience ofwhat Lee calls the "dynamic dramas" 
is not just an intellectual realization of the idea of activity but 
it has a 11:f'elt 11 quality. Nevertheless she does not make clear any 
theory of emotion to help us understand tbe interaction between the 
memories of activity in the mind and the observer's feelings and 
emotions. Originally in the essay· "Beauty and Ugliness" she held a 
kinaesthetic view of empathy which is an answer to the question of 
the interaction of emotion and activity. The activities that were 
experienced in the observer in relation to an object ware physiologi-
cal activities and Lee equated physiological activity with emotions 
(in adherence to the James-Lange theory). 1 It was these EIJI.Otions as 
bodily activities that ware interpreted into the art object. Actually 
Lee had solved two problems with her kiwesthetic view of empathy. 
Both the emotions felt in perceiving an art; object and the qualities 
1Ibid., P• 94. 
-
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projected onto the art object are to be translated into concrete 
physiological terms. The activities perceived in the object corres-
ponded clearly tot he actual physiological feelings of activity in 
the observer. 
Lee bad to abandon the kinaesthetic view because she felt 
that there wasn't sufficient evidence of bodily activity occurring 
in the perception of the objeot. 1 .Although, as we have indicated, 
her later views give a more refined and complex view of the activity 
perceived in the object, there is much obscurity concerning the 
relation of these memories of activity and the feelings and emotions 
of the observer. 
Lee, in her aesthetic, attempts to answer the questions as to 
how motionless objects can appear to be active and moving, 
why motionless shapes should awaken pleasant or unpleasant 
dynamic dramas in our mind, and awaken them very of'ten far 
more vividly than the sight of bodies which we know to be 
really moving through real space, as my gallery observa-
tions testify to the real movements of people and carriages 
seeming dull and dead compared with the intensity of move-
ment attributed to painted or oarved shapes. 2 
In order to explain this Lee postulates the "shape" to be the aesthetic 
object at the expense of the "thing." That is, since there is a cor-
respondence between the lines and points of a shape and the idea of 
movement Lee had concentrated only on the formal aspects of a.n object 
in order to explain motion in inanimate shapes. She postulates as 
1 Ibid., P• 352. 
2 Lee, Beauty and Ugliness, P• 356. 
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irrelevant to the aesthetic experience the subject~tter or ffcontentn 
of an art work. This results in an interesting dUemma. On one hand, 
by concentrating on the formal geometric aspect of things she is 
dealing with tile most universal aspect in that it is not limited to 
this specific phenomenon. It is the theoretical construct abstracted 
from specific phenomena and applicable to other situations. In this 
way the aesthetic experience is a broad one for Lee. But on the other 
hand Lee is limiting that which can be universalized w a certain type 
ot thing, e.e. to geometric, formal relationships. By giving only the 
underlying visual constructs she excludes many aspects of lite which 
could be introduced into the definition of an art work and enrich 
these lines and shapes. For example, a line might express great grace 
in its curve but if this curve is also to portray the bending ot a 
man's back in prayer in a Giottc scene, the curve is given another 
dimension of meaningfulness which enriches the basic construct • 
.Although Lee feels tb:L t attention to the content of an object would 
inhibit one's ability to see it as a shape, we would venture to say 
that part of the richness of art comes as a result of seeing how the 
formal relations and subject~tter of an aesthetic object fit 
together so well. Of course for Lee thar e is richness in the basic 
construct in itself, the rhythm of a line, for example, is significant 
because it brings into play the activities or movements of one's 
experience and it is these activities which are the essence of life. 
Someone who 'Wbuld not define life in Lee's terms of movement could 
- . 
argue that which has been argued above. This ori ticism might be 
levelled at formalistic views of' art in general. By proi'erring e. view 
in which the aesthetic object gives the artistic construction, the 
formal relationships between lines and shapes, they exclude other 
levels of' meaningfulness i'or these lines and shapes. 
Lee's aesthetic theory gives us a system which answers in her 
terms the cognitive problem in the aesthetic experience, e.g. the 
problem of' why we attribute illusory qualities (or qualities which 
do not correspond to any specific sensation in the object) to the 
object. The illusory qualities of' movement are What concerned Lee. 
She explained them as a result of' re-living past movements and attri-
buting the idee. oi' this activity unto the object. But Lee does not 
deal with empathy as a pleasure fUnction. In Lipps it is such because 
pleasure is a fUnction of' empathic cognition, i.e. the realization of' 
the i'orms of' Being in the self'. But i'or Lee attribution itself' does 
not bring pleasure or displeasure to the observer. Rather the object 
causes pleasure or displeasure insoi'e.r as the observer experiences 
"dynamic dramas" which were pleasurable or not pleasurable, but not 
as in Lipps and Munsterberg as a correlate of' attribution. There is 
a machanice.l process inwlved Whereby there is a ce.use-ei'i'ect relation-
ship between object and observer. But since the effect is diffused 
the observer locates it in the object. It is nevertheless the cause-
ei'i'ect situation whiCh is the basis of' pleasure. 
As we have seen, the dynamic dramas that are attributed to 
the object are an abstract type of' activity in the observer. We now 
come to a much more direct view of' activity. This is the view of' 
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Hugo Munsterberg who propounds a view similar to Lee's early kin-
aesthetic view and extends the understanding or activity in his concept 
ot a ~tendency to action." 
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CHAPTER III 
HUGO WNSTERBERG 
Hugo Munsterberg's aesthetic is also based on a theory of 
aesthetic empathy. As do Lipps and Lee, he feels we attribute some-
thing of ourselves to the object. In all cognition we attribute 
qualities to the object but, as has been pointed out, aesthetic 
empathy tries to explain the attribution of certain illusory qualities. 
We can explain these illusory qualities, according to Munsterberg, as 
an extension of the general concept of cognition. Just as we attri-
bute primary sensations (as explained in the Introduction) instantane-
ously without being conscious of associatiug them. with one's 
experienoe1 so too secondary sensations are perceived in the object. 
As does Lee, Munsterberg seems to feel that when we cannot localize 
a sensation in ourselves (as we can in the case of the bee-sting) we 
attribute it to the object. The ~e principle applies to the attri-
bution of qualities at every level of perception. For Munsterberg all 
perception can be understood in terms of' physiological conditions. In 
the aesthetic case that· which occurs in the observer in reaction to 
an art object is the contractions of muscles, nerve tensions, etc. and 
it is this which is attributed to the art object. 
Yes every aesthetic demand in regard to space-
division and outline, light values and color, content 
and meaning and expression can be understood as the 
result of psychological conditions and all can be 
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related to the causal working of ganglion cells and 
nerve fibres, muscles am tEll dons, laws or rervous 
irritation and irradiati. on. nervous excitEment and 
inhibition can e:xplain the totality of facts.J. 
Before we can understand that physiological activity which 
occurs in relation to aesthetic objects we have to see \'lhat happens 
on other levels of perception. 
A. The Three Levels of Perception 
The simplest level of perception for Munsterberg is one in 
which he feels there is no reaction in the db server out side of the 
activity of the eyes am visual processes. The observer focuses on 
the object and records the image in the visual field am attributes 
to the object its shapes and colors. Visually 
we are conscious of -the 1 ocal relations of optical 
points not from the optical sensations themselves but 
from the movemeJ:rl; sensations which crigi.nate witil the 
eyeball muscles and that these muscles move by brain-
reflex for the purpose of bringi.ng an e point after the 
other into the middle point of most distinct vision. 2 
Munsterberg 's emphasis on the movement sensations rather tbl.n optical 
sensations has importance for his theory later on. For the present 
the important fact is that there is a level of perception which affects 
no other part of the body except the eyes. "The eyes follow the out-
lines of the visual objects but the body as a whole remains unmoved. "3 
J.H. Munsterberg, Principles of Art Education, p. 107. 
2 Ibid., P• 81F. 
3zbia., P. a3. 
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This occurs because the observer is involved in something else and 
attributes geometric aspects to the object. i.e. sees its forms but 
does not attribute any other quality of meaningfulness to the objeot. 
We are surrounded with visual fonns which do not affect us more than 
being passing images. 1 But there are some images which cause the 
motor sensations effected by the eye movem.e:z:rt:s to "radiate to other 
muscle groups of our organism. filii This brings us to the second level 
of perception. 3 This is caused by an object in our field of vision 
which demands some practical aotion. 4 The visual image plus the 
observer's psychological state of attention forces the observer to 
attribute to it not only certain geometric qualities but qualities of 
purpose and function. 
We may say that the idea which brings about the action 
is more than the optical impression; it is the optical 
impression plus the idea of the change to be reached by 
the movement, an idea which results from associative 
1Ibid., P• 83f. 
-
2 Ibid. • P• 82. 
~ere are those who would flatly deny this. As has been 
mentioned, Rudolph Ar:Dheim claims that there is no perceptive activity 
outside the eyes and visual field of the brain. He criticizes those 
who say that the visual object brings forth associations which bring 
about muscle or nerve reactions. This is for him one type of percep-
tion imposed upon another. (Art and Visual Perception. pp. 361-376.) 
Arnheim though is building his view on different axio.ms than Munster-
berg. For Ar.nheim, inanimate objects have inherent in them dynamic 
qualities so that all one needs to view qualities of movement is the 
simple visual apparatus. But for Muxisterberg the only way that 
dynamic qualities can be perceived in the object is if the observer 
puts -them there. 1'b.ey can be put there only if the visual impression 
brings about in the observer associations to movement. 
~,1ierberg~ Brinoiplea ~Art Education. pp. 82f-84i'. 
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processes in the brain. We may say in general: whenever 
the given optical impression cormects itself wi tb. the 
idea of a future ef'f'eot or change. the resulting motor 
impulse is felt and interpreted as our awn activity, 
directed towards the future end. 1 
An object perceived as such affects not only the movement of the eyes 
but the motor impulse in the brain stimulates the muscles in other 
parts of the body. This object which is seen as possessing a function 
demands some action from us and so the stimulation of muscular groups 
of the or~sm takes place. The observer must change the object, 
retreat from it or approach it and use it. The object is seen as it 
relates to things outside itself. In contrast to the first level of 
perception this second case is one in which the observer reacts in 
relation to an object. There is bodily movement that goes on besides 
the activity of the eyes. In the first case of the eye movements the 
muscle sensations are localized in the object. That is, as in all 
cognition one is not conscious of e,e movement sensations but only 
of the image that they produce. In this second case, that of the 
stimulation of other muscles of the body in reacting to a practical 
object the movement sensations are felt in the arms, legs or other 
relevant ormans. This of course is because the sensation is not a 
diffuse one and one does not have to localize it in the object but 
is localized, for example, in the arm. by the very raising of the ana. 
to grasp something, or the foot to 'WB.lk. There is no doubt as to 
where the movement sensations are occurring. 
1 ~., P• 841'. 
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In this second case the optical impression does produce a 
bodily movement but the corresponding movement sensation 
is felt as a state of one's own personality, as indication 
of the subjective reaction. We perceive the thing and we 
perceive ourselves as performing the action.~ 
The aesthetic level of perception stands between the two levels 
discussed above. 2 On one hand it is not like the first level of per• 
oeption where the object only affects the eyes. Rather the person 
reacts as a whole person (i.e. a physiological organism) in tbe 
aesthetic situation. In contrast to Lee where the aesthetic object 
is the "shape, 11 the geometric construction, in Munsterberg the object 
is seen as a geometric object only when the observer is not really 
paying attention to the object. The aesthetic situation is like the 
practical one in that it brings into play the same mechanism of 
stimulation of bodily activity. In the perception ot the aesthetic 
object though, this bodily or muscular activity never culminates as 
it must in relation to the practical object, in overt action. The 
motor impulses remain inhibited. The question arises as to how the 
observer reacts, i.e. experiences the innervation of muscles without 
this resulting in overt action. The contraction ot muscles in the arm. 
makes the arm move. How could this contraction occur and not result 
in an actual movement? Munsterberg answers this with the concept of 
the innervation of antagonistic muscles. The observer in reacting to 
an object experiences the contraction of muscles as if he was going to 
1Ibid., P• 89. 
2
_!lli., pp. 85-87. 
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act towards the object but is inhibited from doing so by the movement 
of the opposing muscles which check: and balance out the initial 
action. All the observer experiences is tbe tension between these 
muscles and the feelings of energies that result from this tension. 
The suppression and inhibition of the idea of 
practical future end thus creates a suppression of 
the real external movement, an effect which is pro-
duced in the organism by an innervation of the 
antagonistic muscles. That which the motor impulses 
produce is thus not an actual movement but a system 
of tensions and contractions which gives us sub-
jective feelings or strain, effort, tension, direction, 
movement intention. 1 
B. Aesthetic Object 
The basic question that must be asked is "Why is there an 
inhibition of overt action in relation to the aesthetic object?" 
Why does the physiological activity that occurs in reacting to an 
object not find fulfillment in overt action? First though, we must 
analyze the nature ot aesthetic objects to see why they do not lead 
to overt action as practical objects do. 
1. Isolation ot•esthetio ~bjeot 
For Munsterberg the basic characteristic of the aesthetic 
object is that it is not viewed as a means to any other em but as 
an object of intrinsic value to be contemplated for its own sake. 
There is not in the observer's mind anything else beaides the object 
to be contemplated. He is not concerned as to what the object can be 
1Ibid., p. esr. 
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used for or to What it could lead. 
Is it not possible to come nearer to the object 
itself. to grasp its true reality to feel its life. to 
sink into it. to penetrate into its fulness1 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Is the world for us merely a material to be used and 
never a material to be enjoyed; is the object merely a 
cause to produce certain effects. never an end in itself; 
can our life be complete in itself if everything comes 
in question for us merely as a means to something else. 
and never as valuable in its own offering. 2 
In order to see an object as an end. for its own intrinsic 
value. one has to isolate it from other objects. One caxmot see it 
in relation to objects outside the aesthetic object. fbr then it is 
just a contributing factor to something beyond the object. It is a 
cause for f'urther effects. Isolation is the primary condition for 
an object to be considered an aesthetic object. :3 
2. Contrast of Scientific and Aesthetic Objects 
In line with this Munsterberg tries to show that the 
scientific object is a type of practical object. It does not give 
us knowledge of things as they really are. An analysis of a scien-
tific object tells us what the object is in relation to things outside 
itself'. how it causes other things or what will happen to the object 
under various conditions. 4 
1 Ibid. • P• 19. 
2 Ibid •• P• 29. 
-
lSrbid •• PP• 19-24. 
"'bid. • pp. 9-21. 
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Science does not care at all for 0 itself. Even 
when science enumerates 0 's so-called elements it 
speaks in reality not of 0 but of its causal and 
logical relations to L M N P Q R and the whole alphabet 
of things. 1 
The scientific descriptive account of the elements of an 
object then "does not give aey knowledge of the object itself but it 
tells us what changes can be produced through an analysis of the 
object, what effects we must expect from it • .a Munsterberg thus 
attempts to counter the common view that science gives you k:aawledge 
of the object as it is while the aesthetic experience is a more 
fanoif'ul, less real experience of the object. 
As we have seen, Munsterberg feels that the opposite is true 
for only in the aesthetic experience is the object seen as it is, 
unconnected to things outside itself. 
3. Unity of meaning in object 
Although the aesthetic object is seen as isolated from other 
objects and not leading 'b:> any future end beyond itself Munsterberg 
does not feel, as Lee does, that the only aesthetic object is the 
"shape" or geometric relationships of an object. 3 One oan recognize 
a chair to be a chair, i.e. one can attribute to a picture of a chair 
the £unction of being sat upon and not just attribute to it the 
qualities of shape and color, but this quality of being sat upon 
1 lli!•, P• 16. 
2 Ibid. 1 P• 14. 
3 Ibid., PP• 41, 63. 
55 
does not extend outside the picture. The observer does not consider 
sitting upon it or judge it for its comfort, etc. The object is 
aesthetic if' the various qualities interrelate and hold together as 
a unity independent or other objects. 
It is not that which we rope orr and give a name to as thing 
A or thing B which is aesthetic but rather that which mi~t be called 
the content in the object. Thing A or B has a certain continuity 
that connects it to the past and future. It cannot be seen in isola-
tion. But it can express some meaning which is unconnected to anything 
outside itself'. It is this unity of' meaning in the object which is 
aesthetic. 
Munsterberg feels that there are different types or unities 
of' meaning in a picture, each one or Which could be seen aesthetically~ 
that is, isolated from things outside itself'. An object can be seen 
as a unity or lines and shapes or colors but the highest unity and 
fullest aesthetic object is when the lines and colors best express 
the subject matter or the picture. 
The highest unity [is] that in which content and 
form themselves demand each other • • • What real art; 
demands is that higher stage in which the special 
choice or lines and colors require each other to ful-
fill conditions or complete unity.• 
It is not then only the psychological attitude of' the observer 
who contemplating the object as detached f'rom other objects, creates 
1 Ibid., PP• 40-68. 
--
2 Ibid., P• 66t. 
-
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the isolation necessary to the aesthetic object. As we have just seen, 
the object itself must suggest a unified character and meaning. 
Further in order to bring about in the observer the psychologioa.l 
attitude of isolation of the object from other objeots Munsterberg 
feels that the object must have an appearance of unreality about it. 1 
It it looks too real then one can think of it as if it were a practical 
object with some future end beyond the object. "Beauty is lost when 
the appearance deceives us so as 1x> give the impression of reality. 112 
Therefore Munsterberg feels that aesthetic objects have some 
characteristics which are unlike objects in real life. A painting is 
on a two-dimensional oanvas so cannot be mistaken for a real situation. 
A sculpture is three-dimensional but the color of the material with 
which it is made is unnatural to the subject of' the sculpture and so 
it too has an aura of' unreality about it. 
Ot course, although certain types of' objects are more easily 
isolated from any practioa.l end there is no guarantee that the 
observer will not react to it as a practical object. In the and, 
whether an object is aesthetic is determined by the attitude of' 
isolation the observer takes toward the object. There is no set 
object which is always aesthetic. It depends on the psychological 
attitude taken towards the object. 
We can now understand why there is an inhibition of action, 
l. Ibid., PP• 37-40. 
-
2!1?.!!•, p. 102. 
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why the physiological aoti vi ty never culminates in overt; action in 
relation to aesthetic objects. The aesthetic object is sean as 
isolated £rom other objects. It carries with it no purpose or future 
and for the observer and is :cot seen as it relates to the observer's 
life. It calls forth then no action on the part of the observer. 
The motor impulses which. according to Munsterberg ocour when there 
is a real response to the object (i.e. :cot only a visue.l response) 
have :co reason to bring about mowment of the arms, legs, etc. and 
are inhibited by the antagonistic muscles. There are feelings of 
tensions and contractions in the observer in responding to the arb 
object. 
c. Attribution of Kinaesthetic Feelings 
to the Art; Obj eot 
But Munsterberg is an empathist. The observer does not just 
experienoe the tensions and oontractions in his own body in reaction 
to an art object. In fact according to the condition of isolation 
it is the object alone which absorbs the observer. He camot be con-
scious of these tensions at the same time that he is absorbed in the 
aesthetic object alone. What happens 'then is that these bodily 
activities are felt as activities of the object. 1 There is an 
instanta.neous attribution of the activities of the observer to the 
object. In overt; activity the observer localizes his sensations in 
his arms or legs or head by the Tery movement or aoti vity of these 
1 ~., pp. 85-87. 
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organs but in relation to the aesthetic object overt movement has been 
inhibited and one cannot localise his bodily activities in any pa.rti-
oular organ. These bodily activities are experienced in the observer 
as diffuse feelings of energy. He localises them in that which is the 
source of his actiTi ty, the aesthetic object. 
Nothing beyond the idea of the optical impression 
was to be in our mind. thus we are not thinking of our-
selves as objeots. as empirical personalities, every 
thought concerning ourselves and our actions would lead 
us away and would link the visual impression with some-
thing else. The result must be that the feelings of 
strain and impulse which go on in ourselves are not 
projected into our body but into the visual impression. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 
As soon as the visual impression is really isolated 
and all other ideas really excluded then the motor 
impulses do not awake actions which are taken as actions 
ot ourselves but feelings of energy which are taken as 
energies of the visual forms and lines. 1 
The feelings or energy- then that occur as a result of the 
tensions and contractions (the activities that never become externally 
realized) are attributed to the object and seen as characteristics of' 
the object. 
We have seen how :Munsterberg 's system of empathy answers some 
ot the questions of cognition in the aesthetic experience. The 
secondary qualities of moveme!It and activity are attributed to the 
object because there are physiological activities gping on in the 
observer in reaction to the object which, as in Lee, cannot be localized 
in any sense in the observer but can be attributed to that in which he 
is absorbed. 
1Ibid., P• sa. 
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D. Aesthetic Pleasure 
Munsterberg 's theory of em.pa thy oo ntri butes to the problem of 
pleasure in i::te aesthetic experience in an interesting way. An object 
is felt as pleasant or unpleasant according to how the object harmo-
nizes with the physiological makeup of the observer. J. If the lines of 
the object for example, bring about tensions a :Dd contractions which 
conflict with the natural tendencies of the cb server then these bring 
about feelings of discomfort and displeasure in the observer. 
If the energies whiah we feel in the lines are 
external projections of our own energies we understand 
the psyohologioa.l reasons why certain combinations of 
lines please us and others do not • As long as the 
lines are geometrical figures only any combination of 
lines has its right to existence, as soon as they 
represent energies we say that the aesthetic dema:ai 
prescribes how the lines noughtn to be. They ought 
to be such that they oorrespond to tile natural energies 
of our own organ.ism and represent the harmony of our 
own muscular functions because every interference with 
the natural innervations of our system would turn our 
attention to our own body and would destroy thus the 
isola.tion. 2 
Underlying this view of pleasure is a basic philosophical vin-
on the part of Munsterberg. 
He feels that the obserTer must create an ordered world out of 
the chaos of sense impressions. He must perceive a harmony and agree-
ment of parts in 1:h e world. He achieves this 'th- ough aesthetic per-
caption, i.e. by seeing an object out off from any connections outside 
itself--seeing it as a. unity of intrinsic relationships. An observer 
J.~ ... pp. 88-100. 
2 Ibid., p. 88. 
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can realize the harmony in the world if he himself is in harmony and 
agreement with the objects of tm world.1 If the energies of 'tile 
object conflict with his own natural energies the state of isolation 
is broken and the observer turns his mind to his own body and is 
conscious of himself and his own feelings. In this state 'the observer 
does not gain aesthetic pleasure since aesthetic pleasure is felt 
only thro~h grasping the harmony of 'the world by realizing the 
intrinsic value of the object. Em.pa thy i:h en is a pre requisite .f'o r 
pleasure in the aesthetic experience. 
E. Concluding Remarks on 
Munsterberg's Theory 
As can be seen .from everything that has been said until now, 
Munsterberg 'a aesthetic theory focuses on the pleasure of experiencing 
an object as it is in itself, i.e. for its own intrinsic value in 
order to find a unity and harmony in objects of the world. But what 
is the "itself" inherent in the object whi oh makes it so important to 
experience an object for its intrinsic value? Is it, as in Lipps, 
the knowledge of underlying reality of an object which is gained through 
the aesthetic experience? Munsterberg speaks of isolation and attrib-
ution as bringing "repose" in the objec~ "for Beauty demands only that 
we feel oursel vas into the will of Nature._., This migpt indicate 
metaphysical presuppositions whereby the observer would be at one 
11u.nsterberg, "The ProblEill of Beauty," Philosophical Review, 
XVIII (1909), PP• 121-146. 
2Munsterberg, Principles of Art Education, p. 114. 
~unsterberg, "The Problem of Beauty," p. 134. 
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with the object and be pa.rticipating in the Being of the object. This 
Being would then be the underlying reality, the intrinsic value of the 
object. 
But Munsterberg does not carry thrcugh these implications. 
He does not seem to feel that there is a ready-made world behind 
experience but turns to the structure of' 1h e observer's e:xperience 
'00 explain the harmony between the oo server and object. Since. on 
the psychological side, Munsterberg explains the structure of the 
observer's experience in psyoho .. physiological terms he must seek an 
explanation to what he means by "intrinsic value" and "repose" from 
this frame of reference. 
First one could say that the intrinsic value of the .object 
is its unity of meaning, i.e. simply how the various parts of' the 
object "hold together. n This line balances that and best expresses 
the object so that the object stands as a unified whole. The observer 
is held in contemplation of' this unity of the pa.rts. But as we have 
seen. these relationships of' lines to the whole are perceived not 
only by following these intrinsic relations 'W::i. th the movements of' 
the eyes but by reacting to them through tba innervations of' muscle 
impulses. the tendencies to action. It is the energies which are a 
result of' these tendencies to action 'lhat define the picture. The 
intrinsic value for which the picture is isolated is then these 
energies that are attributed to the object. The aesthetic object is 
isolated so that it can be experiemed for its intrinsic value but 
the intrinsic value is the experiencing of the energies of' the 
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observer in t~ object. The philosophical concepts of "intrinsic 
value" and "harmony with an object" become psychological concepts but 
one doesn't know whether this is really what Munsterberg wants. He 
doesn't integrate, to any great extent, his philosophical concepts 
wi. th his theory of 'the psyoholo~cal processes. They seem to be 
parallel views which touch at a ff1Vf points. 
As far as the psychology of attribution is concerned he does 
not deepen our understanding of the process much beyond Lee. He does 
though contribute an important concept in his "tendency to action." 
The aesthetic experience is not a passive one. In fact, the aesthetic 
object brings about in the observer the sailS physiological activity 
as the practical object except i::ba t it doesn't culminate in overt 
action. 
Munsterberg's psychological theory is based on a James-Lange 
theory of emotions which equates emotion with physiological activity. 
Aesthetic enjoyment is one type of emotion and it means for Munster-
berg the physiological activities, the tmsions and contractions that 
occur when there is a tendency to action. 
Munsterberg proposes his theory on these theoretical grounds 
rather than as the results of experime:rxtal inquiry vhioh would be 
necessary to validate this type of aesthe ti. c theory. But much experi-
mental inquiry that has taken place sim e Munsterberg propounded his 
theory in 1905 has been found to agree with his idea of a "tendency 
to action" in that experimenters were abls to make actual measurements 
of muscular micro-movements. 
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CONCLUSION 
As a result of the foregoing chapters it is posSble to 
characterize Lipps' views as ll_philosoph:iDal 11 or "metaphysical" 
while Lee oan come under 'the category of "psyoholcgical. 11 There 
seems to be some ambiguity in Jlunsterberg but in the .f'1.ml analysis 
it would seem. that his emphasis is on the psychological rathEr 'than 
the philosophical. 
The "metaphysical" is com erned wi'th the underlying reality 
of objects of the 1Drld. Lipps' concern with what is happening in 
the observer is because oftbe observer's role in realizing qualities 
of Being in an object. So aJ.tilou§l Lipps goes to great lengths 1D 
explain the psychological state of the observer reacting 'to a work 
of art. these psyohological processes aze nat; his basic interest but 
are significant in tba t 'they are part of a deeper situation. 
Lee and UunsterbErg e.re basically co merned with the 
psychology of tm person. MunstErb8l" g is sefk illg a knowledge of the 
world in tile harmony of the objects of the world. But this can 
only be fou:cd if the observer is in harmony with the objects of the 
"WOrld. This harmony is experie med by tbe observer 'through the 
psychological process of empathyt :Munsterberg 's philosoph:iDal goal 
is reduced to a psychologioa.l process. So 'that for Munstarberg as 
well as Lee there is no activity occurring in the object in which 
the observer participates as there is for Lipps. Rather 1he activity 
64 
with which they are most interested is tile "goings-on" in b observer 
and heM' tile se 11goingsoMOn• are transferred to the object to make the 
object appea.r alive and moving. or also in Munstarber g 's case 1» bring 
the observer- into harmony wi 1:h tbe object. Therefore Lee and Munster• 
berg do not basically concern themselves with a metaphysical :f'rame-
work. They emphasize individual details of the meoblnism. of reaction 
and attribution, i.e. tile psyWl.ologio al process by which movemeut and 
activity are perceived in the cb ject. 
The problem arises though. 'that Lee and Munster berg's "psycho-
logical• Tiew might be taken as answeril'€ metaphysical questions. 
Particularly, concerning the problaa of' the reality of objects in the 
wea-ld one might -~ their view w be 1:ha t objects exist only in the 
observer's mind. But actually we cannot deduce tili" for the empath-
ists are interested in tbe psychological existence of the objects. 
(Even Munster-berg, as we he.ve pointed out, reduces his inberest in the 
true :rature of objects to the psychological process.) That is why 
they emphasize the object as sensations in the observer's mind. It 
is not necessarily because they f'eal that the object only exists as 
sensations in the observer's mind. They do not come to answer thd.s 
question. 
There are nevertheless questions 'Which migtlt arise concerning 
the nature of the psychological existence of an object. Does every 
object have a psychologtcaJ. existence which remains the same or does 
it change wi tb. each new experience? Is tmre sad psychological 
essence which tile observer perceives and to 'Which he adds elaborations, 
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distortions, expressions, i.e. illusory characteristics, ar is the 
object perceived with different illusory qualities oons:idered a 
different object in the mind ot tbe observer? This type of question 
oan be answered within tb9 scope of Lee's and Munsterberg 's "psycho-
logical" aesthetic. It would seem that in both Lee am Muns1:erberg 
tbe object exists psychologically anew each time. For in both the 
illusory qualities are seEn as- an integral part of 'the whole 
aesthetic object and not as a pasic object plus the expressive 
qualities added. Also Munsterberg feels bt one is oonstantl;y 
creating a world out of 'the chaos of sense impressions which implies 
that objects change tor the observer with eaoh new experience. (It 
is necessary though, for purposes of explanation, to make the dis-
tinction between the basic sensations of an object and illusory 
qualities in order ix> discuss the aesthetic experience as distin-
guished from other experie mea.) 
One further observation that can be Dade on the basis of 
tbe distinction between the empathists as "psychological" ani 
"metaphysical." This is 'that theoretically speaking> aooording to 
Lee aDi Munsterberg>we would with mere knowledge of tbe human makeup 
be able to trace reactions in relation to an aesthetic object to 
specific psychological or physiologioal. processes in the observer. 
We would be able to explain what &n the psyohologioal causes of 'the 
aesthetic experience. Lipps ' metaphysical visw would imply -that 
there are qualities in the aesthetic experience which go beyond 'the 
observer am tbe object. Since the ultimte nature of "these b 
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unknowable the aesthetic experience could never be entirely understood 
di scur111i vely. 
The implications of all 'the thecries discussed in this paper 
are 'that the empathic process is synonymous w.ith the aesthetic 
process. It is not just one aspect of tm aestmtio exp:~r ienoe 
but rather defines the aesthetic experience. It is the Vf!!rY vray 
that people perceive and gain pleasure fzom objects aesthetically. 
For Lipps it is the whole process whereby we intuit into the life 
of other objects. For Lee, aesthetic mans that which is sem as 
a "shape" so that it manifests activity. Attribtti~ activity to 
an object is the very stuff or Empathy. Similarly in :Munster berg, 
to see thi:ogs aesthetically would lD9 an to see an object in isolation, 
out off from everything else. The only way tl:a. t can be do:m is 1i' 
all of one 's reactions (which are f'or Munster berg physiological 
processes) are felt as occurring in the object. This is, of course, 
another description of' aesthetic experience as empathy. 
The popular view of' empathy as a projection of one's emotions 
on an art work implies that tbe concept of' empathy is one aspect, 
i.e. the emotional aspect of a mere ge:r:sra 1 aesthetic view,. But tbe 
views of' empathy discussed here are not only concerned w.i th the 
attribution of' emotions but in a sense all of' those qualities, 
primary and what we have called "illusory, • that go into the cognition 
of' an aesthetic object. 
But the question arises as w whether 'the aesthetic 
experience as empathy involves any faculty of' judgment, an ability 
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to stand or£ and judge a work of art in discursive terms; For example, 
whether during the experience of empathy with a visual art object, one 
can ascertain if tbe colors, sha~ sand sd>ject matter ot a painting 
f1~ together well. 
According to the empathists one can call something 'beautiful 11 
or "ugly" if it does or does not bri~ about pleasure in tile observer. 
in Lee's case something is pleasant; 1t it brings about asa:ooiattans 
to past activities that are pleasant;; in Munsterberg's case it is 
pleasant if tile observer grasps tbt J:armony of 1:be world by his harmocy 
with the •rld; in Lipps '• aesthetic pleasure is a function at: the 
metaphysic. But in his view, as in Lee and Munsterberg, the evaluation 
of beauty or ugliness in an object does not o~ about by a voluntary 
conscious, intellectual judgment on the plrt of tile observEr. It is 
a result ot unconscious processes occurring in the observer. Yet it 
is interesting to note 'that although ibe observer cannot distance him-
self to analyze the aesthetic object, he does not, according 1:o any of 
the empathists, feel a personal identification and imolvement with 'the 
object. One's feelings in reaction to an object become part of tile 
objeot am are not identified with tile observer's own life. The problsn 
ot the nan who is jealous of h:ls 01rn wif'e getti:q; so personally involved 
in Othello that he cannot enjoy the play would not occur because the 
observer's absorption is al•ys in the object and not in himself'. In 
fact, this isolatton is 'the very co mition for empathy in :Munsterberg 
am the meaning ot "shape 11 fer Lee. .Also. Lipps stroxgly negates any 
idea of ibe observer be:ing oonsoioUI of' activity in his own boC\"• 
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It is somewhat paradoxical then that according to 'these empathy 
theories, on the cognitive level the observer is a> caught up in -the 
object tl:a t he attributes his cwn state to -the object and yet 'that 
there is a built-in distancing mechanism whereby 'the observer never 
takes his reactions to 'the picture as his own feelings to be acted 
upon. Re.thtr these feelings are used to intensity 'the visual experi-
enoe. 
It should be nciied that tile above example from othello is not 
altoggther fitting although it portrays tile problem of persom.l 
involve.DBx:t which was being discussed. That is beoe.use 'these empathy 
theories apply basically to visual arts. Al thoug,il Lee attempts at 
points to extend ber theory to music, one is hard put to see haw e.ey 
of the empathy 'theories can be translated in tot;o to explain tile 
aesthetic experience for 'the various forms of literature or music. 
Lipps is the only one whose fl"8llll8110rk is gEilat"al mough to 
subsume arts other than 'the visual ones. Participation in the life 
activity of an object certainly aeems possible in the musical eJCPeri-
ence. tl:though ihere is b :troblem in 1:he musical experience as to 
'What exactly is 'the aesthetic object (the musical score, tbe orchestra, 
etc.), this does not aff'ect Lipps f'or 'the activity need not be taking 
place in any identifiable object as long as tle forces of life e.re 
being expressed.. He even says -that smell can be aesthetic if', tar 
example, it rises from the grou:Dd on e. spring dq to indicate 'the life 
activities taking place. 1 
1 Ibid., Vol. I• P• 211. 
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Lee and Munster-berg on the otmr hand seem w be very much 
tied to visual perception. Tmir view .. of attri but:;ion of qualities 
implies an identifiable and defined object upon which to project the 
activity of ihe observer. This applies to 'the viwal arts where 
there is a well-defined art object. Also si. nee this attribution does 
not involve conscious intellectual effort, it cannot expla:in the lllOl"e 
complex and various types of attributi.on that must take place in the 
literary arts. This limitation applies 1D Lipps as well because his 
concept of empathy involves an immediate feeling which he claims that 
the intellectual process precludes. 1 
Gena-ally spea.lcing then. although aspects of empathy thecr ies 
might be tacked on here or there to explain o1her kir:ds of aesthetic 
experiemes, 1:iley were created to e~lain visual aesthetic experience 
and 1he theories of Lee and Munsterberg and, 1n some extent, Lipps 
are most under standa.ble in ih ese terms. 
1 Ibid., Vol. II, P• 11. 
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ABSTRACT 
The theories ot empathy in the vi sua.l aestret ic e :liP erience 
as propoumed by Tb.eodor Lipps, Vernon Lee and Hugo Munsterberg 
attempt to explain cognition ar qualities that do nat correspond 
to any specific sensations due to an object, but are nevertheless 
attributed to the object just as ihe specific sensations (e.g. ot 
red or blue) are attributed to it. 
Pleasure felt as a result c£ e:xperienoing ihe aesthetic 
object is not felt as occurr~ in the observer's body but as tied 
up with the cibjeot. 
The empathists discussed haw different e:xplanations tar the 
VI8.Y that this attribution ot what seem to be "illusory qualities" 
is aobi eved. 
For Theodor Lipps empathy is a more oo mplex process than 
it is tor the other empathists. .According to his view the observer, 
on one mnd, participates in the lite and activity ar 'the object, 
and, on the other hand, attributes these "illusory" qualities to the 
object. 
This paradox can be explained by the tact tha. t urderlying 
all objects, animate and inanimate, is a comn.on mode of Being. The 
observer can only realize the Being in an external object by applying 
the categories ot Being in his own experience to it • These are tl:B 
"inner ideas" tba t go to comprise the self and 'Whi oh are applied to 
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an external object in order ~ ~rcei ve the deeper qualities of Being 
that exist in the object beneath the sensation level. By applying 
the internal ideas to the object, i.e. extending his self, the 
observer is thEreby participating in the Being of 1:he object at the 
same time as he is attributing to it qualitjs s on the perceptive 
level. 
This accounts fer both tb.e cognition of ''illusory qualities" 
and the pleasure gained from empathy 'through the participation in the 
Being of the object. 
Lipps begins the dewlopmeut of his idea of the activity of 
the self from the simplest case of experiencing the self through one •s 
own activity. He then applies it to the activity of another human 
beixg, the representation of activity in an inanimate object am 
finally to tm inanimate object which is not active but manifests 
emotion, force and unity by the observer applying these internal 
ideas to tb. e object. 
Vernon Lee develops a concept of empathy from an orientation 
which is basically psychological in cac.trast to the more metaphysical 
orientation at' Lipps. Her basic concern is how the "psyohologjoal 
processes" in the obsarver can be perceived in the object to :rmlm the 
object appear alive and moving. This is accomplished by the principle 
of the "merging of the perceptive process" of the observer in 'bbe 
object of obsenation. That is, all the activities that occur in the 
observer during perception at an aesthet io objec-t are attributed to 
'the object being peroei ved. Just as tm sensation of color is 
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attributed to 'the object being perceived, it is also true that ihe 
activities occurring in the observer during perception of an aesthetic 
object (since they are of a diffuse character and cannot be localized 
in the observer) are attributed to the aestl:8tie object. 
The aotivitie s that go on in relation to an aesthetic object 
are not actual bodily activities (as Lee onoe .f'el t). Bather they are 
the memories of past movement am activity, the ideas of which are 
attributed to the aesthetic object to give it the quality of life 
and activity. 
Lee's aesthetic object is particularly sui ted to thi. s attrib-
ution of move~nt because it is a 11shape , 11 a two-dimensioml, geometric 
figure, rather tban a "thing," an object with all types of associations 
that lead the mind away from the object itself. The fbnnal geometrical 
character of the aesthetic object fits'.·' ihe concept of movement sime 
the eye moves in perceiving the points of a geometrical figure and 
brings forth memories of past movement. 
Activity seems to be for Lee the central characteristic of 
life and therefore any inanimate object that is seen as possessing 
the quality of movement expresses life and is an aesthetic object. 
If' the activity expressed brings forth pleasant associations, it is 
beauti:f'ul. If these associa ti. ons are unpleasant, it is ugly. 
Hugo Munsterberg stands between the psydlolog:loal am philo-
sophical approaches 1x> empathy. 
Speaking philosophically he sees aesthetic perception as a 
necessary way of creating meaning in a chaotic universe of impressions. 
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He characterizes its manner of doing so as isolationt an object is 
appreciated for its own intrinsic warthJ it is seen as disconnected 
from everybhing outside itself. Science connects objects 'While .Art 
isolates them. 
The meaning of the object is in the bl.rmony and unity or 'the 
parts, and the observer • in order to realize this meaning. must oou 
into harmony with the object. Nothing aside from tm object must be 
in the observer's mind. It must not be seen as something to act upon. 
for then not 'the object. but sane ra-ther em, is in mini. 
The psychological reason for this taking place is the. t in 
perceiving the aesthetic object the observer does mt localize his 
reactions in his OW'n body as he does in react:in g to a practical object 
in relation to which he must act--his anna or legs or mad must move. 
But rather since the object alone fills his consciousness. the 
observer's reactions must become localized in the object so that it 
seems to mow and bend am strain. 
For Munsterberg the reactions or the observer are expressed 
in physiolog ice.l terms. But since muscular tensions must result in 
some external movement and this is ndi possible in the aesthetic 
expar ience, Munsterberg e:xplains what happens as a "tendency to 
action." The muscles whose activity in relation to a practical 
object would culminate in movemurt. of limbs or head in the aesthetic 
case is inhibited by its antagonistic muscles. The observer does not 
act but e:xperiem es feelings or stress and strain which are looaljj: ad 
in the aesthetic object. 
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According to Munster bar g the observer finds pleasure in repose 
in the object, in tbe very attribution of' his own reactions in the 
object. 
The intrinsic meaning of the aesthetic object, Munster berg's 
philosophical goal, is "the harmony of' tile whole which is e:x:per iem ed 
by the observer through his own psychological activities. The 
philosophical then is reduced to the ps~holog:ic a1. 
The empathists equate Empathy with the aesthetic experieme. 
Sime judgiJe~S of' beauty, according -m 'than, are not intellectual, 
voluntary judgment; 1 but the results of' an unconscious psychological 
process, it can be deduced that intellectual jucgment is nat for the 
empathists part of' the aesthetic ];r'Ocess. Yet, according to the 
empathiats, the observer does not identify personally with the aesthetic 
object am apply it to his own life. If' anything the movenent is 
outward. He applies his own life to the object. 
The empathists have dealt basically with the visual experience 
and it is only with difficulty that the:tr theories can be e:rbanded 
to other experiences. 
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